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Innovation has been acknowledged by both researchers and practitioners as a vital tool to 
yield growth and maintain competitive advantages. However, firms face stiff challenges 
in managing innovations. Developing new product generally requires substantial resource 
input, but the success rate is usually low due to internal technical difficulties and external 
market uncertainties. Even with successful innovative products, it is not guaranteed that 
the innovators will be rewarded for their efforts and investments, as the return from 
innovations may be siphoned off by suppliers, customers, and competitors. To profit from 
innovations, firms need to first create value with the right R&D strategies, and further 
capture value in the execution of innovations when dealing with the relevant partners. 
This dissertation studies the management of innovations and addresses these two 
important issues respectively. In the first essay, we investigate how strategically 
managing information can improve the new product performances in competitive R&D 
markets. The new product development process is essentially a series of inter-linked 
information processing activities: firms generate ideas, gather information from external 
environment to evaluate the feasibility and potential of the ideas, conduct research to 
create new knowledge and intellectual property, and finally commercialize the new 
knowledge into the market to generate value. We focus on how firms should acquire and 
manage external market information in competitive R&D markets, and how the 
information acquisition and management strategies impact their R&D investment 
decisions. The second essay studies how firms should manage the relationship with the 
relevant parties in the execution of innovations. The intrinsic uncertainty in the 
materialization of innovations, the intangibility of technical knowledge assets, and the 
difficulty of specifying and monitoring the performance of the other party, are the 
primary clauses that give rise to the hold-up problem in innovation partnerships -- that is, 
the R&D investment by a firm leaves it vulnerable to ex post opportunistic behaviors by 
its contracting partner (whether its supplier, customer, or joint venture partner). We study 
how the operational aspect of an evolving relationship may influence a firm's innate 
incentives to take advantage and `hold-up' the partner and mitigate the hold-up problem 
in innovation partnerships. The third essay extends the discussion of hold-up problem to 
general incomplete contracts and moral Darwinism. In conventional economic models, 
rational players are usually assumed to be self-interested and can take opportunistic 
actions to maximize their own payoffs, while socially desirable traits such as honesty and 
trust are often characterized as irrational and studied as deviations from tenets of 
rationality. However, these irrational traits are commonly observed in practice despite the 
widespread nature of incomplete contracts which have plenty of room for opportunism. 
This essay asks why traits such as honesty have not been weeded out by economic 
Darwinism, and offers a justification that the choice of honesty emerges both as desirable 
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Innovation has been acknowledged by both researchers and practitioners as a vi-
tal tool to yield growth and maintain competitive advantages. However, firms face stiff
challenges in managing innovations. Developing new product generally requires substantial
resource input, but the success rate can be as low as 20% due to internal technical difficulties
and external market uncertainties (cf. Mansfield and Wanger, 1975; Lauga and Ofek, 2008).
Even with successful innovative products, it is not guaranteed that the innovators will be
rewarded for their efforts and investments, as the return from innovations may be siphoned
off by suppliers, customers, and competitors (Pisano and Teece, 2007). Hence, to profit
from innovations, firms need to first create value with the right R&D strategies, and fur-
ther capture value in the execution of innovations when dealing with the relevant partners.
This dissertation studies the management of innovations and address these two important
issues respectively. In the first essay, we investigate how strategically managing informa-
tion can improve the new product performances in competitive R&D markets. The new
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product development process is essentially a series of inter-linked information processing
activities: firms generate ideas, gather information from external environment to evaluate
the feasibility and potential of the ideas, then conduct research to create new knowledge
and intellectual property, and finally commercialize the new knowledge into the market to
generate value. We focus on how firms should acquire and manage market information in
competitive R&D markets — in particular, we spotlight two most important information
acquisition channels in R&D markets: customers and competitors in the target market,
and study how the strategic information acquisition and management decisions impact the
R&D investment decisions and market structures. The second essay studies how firms
should manage the relationship with the relevant parties in the execution of innovations.
The intrinsic uncertainty in the materialization of innovations, the intangibility of technical
knowledge assets, and the difficulty of specifying and monitoring the performance of the
other party, are the primary clauses that give rise to the hold-up problem in innovation
partnerships — that is, the R&D investment by a firm leaves it vulnerable to ex post op-
portunistic behaviors by its contracting partner (whether its supplier, customer, or joint
venture partner). We study how the operational aspect of an evolving relationship may
influence a firm’s innate incentives to take advantage and ‘hold-up’ the partner and miti-
gate the hold-up problem in innovation partnerships. The third essay builds on the second
essay and extends the discussion to general incomplete contracts and moral Darwinism. In
conventional economic models, rational players are usually assumed to be self-interested
and can take opportunistic actions to maximize their own payoffs, while socially desirable
traits such as honesty and trust are often characterized as irrational and studied as devia-
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tions from tenets of rationality. However, these irrational traits are commonly observed in
practice despite the widespread nature of incomplete contracts which have plenty of room
for opportunism. This essay asks why traits such as honesty have not been weeded out by
economic Darwinism, and offers a justification that the choice of honesty emerges both as
desirable and rational under very reasonable conditions.
1.1 An Overview of Essay 1
The market for new products is typically plagued with a lack of information on
several key dimensions such as market size and customer preferences. Not surprisingly
then, better market information plays a defining role in improving the performance of firms
which launch new products. Hence, many firms conduct market research to analyze key
customers and market needs before key R&D decisions are made. The importance given to
market research by firms can be gauged from the fact that the global spending on acquiring
information on characteristics of a new-product market increased to a staggering $39 billion
in year 20121. For instance, Samsung has an astonishing number of 60,000 employees in
various countries across the world dedicated exclusively to researching the market for their
products through customer polls and third-party reports (Chen, 2013). Off-late, in addition
to market research, competitive intelligence is gaining prominence where firms monitor their
competitors in order to ascertain their key decisions. Eli Lilly’s new product planning group
routinely monitors competitors — such as what products rival firms are planning to introduce
in the market and what kinds of input they use — to assess market rewards and forge its




own R&D decisions (Ofek and Turut, 2008). A recent survey of 400 global companies by
Fuld&Company finds that despite the recent economy downturn, the number of companies
that spend over $1 million per year on competitive intelligence programs has doubled in the
past five years (Competitive Intelligence Global Benchmarking Project Update 20132).
But unlike market research, which relies on willing customers to reveal informa-
tion, competitive intelligence ironically relies on the implicit ‘participation’ of scheming
competitors — in the sense that CI can always be neutered if the rival conceals its decisions
or information. And indeed several firms, notably Apple, excel at such concealment. Ap-
ple takes ironclad measures, such as strictly restricting access to key R&D areas, to using
strong-arm tactics to gag employees from revealing information under the threat of “termi-
nation and prosecution to the fullest extent that our lawyers can”, to prevent information
from leaking out to competitors, see Lashinsky (2012).
Hence, key research questions that emerge are: Can competitive intelligence emerge
as a viable information acquisition strategy even when competitors can conceal their deci-
sions and information? Can it ever replace market research, i.e., would firms ever choose
competitive intelligence over market research? Which (or both, or neither) information ac-
quisition strategies should firms pursue in competitive R&D markets? How does the pres-
ence of competitive intelligence impact firms’ market research decisions, R&D decisions,
and industry welfare? (For instance, would firms alter their R&D investment strategies in
light of potential competitive intelligence by rivals? Would competitive intelligence hurt or




To address these questions, we develop a dynamic model where two risk-neutral
firms compete for market shares in a new-product category by making costly R&D in-
vestments. The market value of the new product is uncertain, and the final profits are a
function of the investment levels and the realized market value. A key feature of our model
is that firms can actively manage their information — right from acquiring market informa-
tion through market research, or acquiring information on competitor’s decisions through
competitive intelligence, or both, to being able to conceal or reveal either component. Ad-
ditionally, our parsimonious model captures the key features of competitive R&D markets
such as market uncertainty, information acquisition, firm heterogeneity, and sequence of
innovations.
Our study provides the following novel results. First, we show that under very
reasonable conditions, an asymmetric equilibrium exists (even when firms are symmetric ex
ante) in which one firm forgoes market research but successfully acquires information on
its rival though competitive intelligence, whereas the other firm does only market research.
Hence, we prove that competitive intelligence can emerge endogenously as an optimal and
viable information acquisition strategy even though () competitors can conceal their in-
formation; () market research is costless; and () market research can perfectly resolve
market uncertainty and can also provide additional value through a better understanding
of customer needs. In fact, we go one step further and prove that in this asymmetric equi-
librium, the firm doing CI not only ascertains the competitors investment, but it can also
perfectly infer the uncertain market size — hence, there is no information asymmetry in
that equilibrium, both firms know the true market size even when only one firm conducts
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market research. A corollary of the above outcome is that competitive intelligence induces
sequential innovations even when firms are ex ante symmetric — i.e., in this asymmetric equi-
librium, the firm with superior market information invests early, and is the pioneer, while
the one with inferior market information waits as a follower to conduct CI. We further
show that competitive intelligence induces sequential innovation even when both firms do
market research, but if one firm has a stronger ‘market power’ than the other firm. There
is also a dark side to competitive intelligence in that it blunts the incentives for market
research — there exist conditions under which neither firm does market research — for fear
of potential competitive intelligence by the rival — even if MR is free, can perfectly resolve
market uncertainty and also reaps additional benefits (such as higher margins) through a
better understanding of customer needs. And finally, we show that competitive intelligence
can increase total industry profits by endogenously creating a credible information channel
between competing firms.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that formally proves that competitive
intelligence emerges endogenously in competitive R&D markets and establishes its nuanced
interactions with the classical market research and investment decisions.
1.2 An Overview of Essay 2
Due to the inherent uncertainty and complexity, it is usually difficult to perfectly
contract the exchange and use of technical knowledge, which gives rise to the hold-up threat
in the execution of innovations. In the hold-up problem (cf. Klein et al., 1978), a firm’s
relationship-specific investments — i.e., investments which are most useful within a spe-
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cific relationship — leaves it vulnerable to ex post opportunistic behavior by its contracting
partner (whether its supplier or its customer). For instance, suppliers in the automotive
industry complain that “Domestic OEMs typically leverage discussions around suppliers’
innovation and then ask them to specify the innovation. Once done, they plagiarize the
supplier-provided specification to various other suppliers in an attempt to beat down the
price.”(The 29th Annual Ward’s Supplier Survey, Murphy 2007).
Two conditions interweave to create the possibility of hold-up: () relationship-
specific investments, and () non-contractible outcomes arising out of contract incomplete-
ness. Both elements are present and common in the innovation partnerships. First, the
delivery of the R&D investments is intangible technical knowledge, so once the innovator
shows the information to the partner, it is almost impossible to revoke the contract and
the resale value of the knowledge can drop significantly. Second, incomplete contracts are
common in innovation partnerships, because of the substantial intrinsic uncertainty in the
materialization of innovations and the difficulty of specifying and monitoring the use of
technical information. Hence, the hold-up threat is prevalent in innovation partnerships.
The hold-up threat stifles investments and leads to inefficient outcomes. The reme-
dies proposed to blunt opportunism (and thereby prevent hold-ups) under such enabling
circumstances as provided by incomplete contracts, are often complex (e.g., sophisticated
vertical contracts), and extreme (such as vertical integration). Several questions arise that
we attempt to address in this research. Given the propensity to hold-ups, why is vertical
integration not more widespread, and why do so many bilateral relationships thrive (as
also noted by Coase, 2006)? Furthermore, why do so many of these firms employ simple
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contracts instead of the more sophisticated contracts proposed in the literature? How is the
threat of holdup mitigated in practice (as the evidence indicates it must be)?
A possible unifying explanation for all the above questions is that firms do honor
their contractual obligations, even when presented with opportunities to hold-up. As
Macaulay (1963) argues: “. . . a key virtue of relational contracting is that parties can count
on each other to abide by the spirit of the contract. . . one doesn’t run to lawyers if he wants
to stay in business because one must behave decently.” The question that then arises is:
Would firms choose to be irrationally honest (defined in this context as not holding up their
contracting partners)?
This paper investigates how the operational aspect of evolving relationships may
influence the a firm’s innate incentive to ‘hold-up’ its innovation partner. In specific, we
study a context of a vertical innovation relationship, wherein the upstream firm (a supplier)
makes R&D investments to develop the innovation, and the downstream firm (a manufac-
turer) commercializes the new product to the end market. Since the market return of the
new product relies on and is collected through the manufacturer’s marketing and distribu-
tion channels, the manufacturer may hold-up the supplier once the investment is made and
extract all the value generated by the innovation. The innovation partnership lasts for two
periods. In each period, the sequence of events is as follows. In stage 1, the manufacturer
asks the supplier to develop the innovation and contracts to pay the supplier a fraction of
the future realized value of investment. In stage 2, the supplier decides on his effort level. In
stage 3, the project value is realized. Finally, in stage 4, there is potential for hold-up: the
manufacturer may renegotiate and pay the supplier a lower payment than the contracted
9
value.
Our model has three essential features: () A dynamic (two-period) setting to
capture repeated interactions between the manufacturer and its supplier; () The manu-
facturers can be one of three types: rational (i.e., long-run expected utility maximizer who
can hold up the supplier if it is optimal to do so, or play honest otherwise), honest (i.e., who
never holds up the supplier), or cheat (short-run profit maximizer who always holds up the
supplier); and () A tendency for all types of manufacturer to tremble into myopic behav-
ior — manufacturers may play their optimal myopic (single-period) strategy, even when this
differs from their optimal dynamic strategy, for reasons ranging from bounded rationality
to intra-firm incentive conflicts.
Our results show that, in a single period, the rational manufacturer outperforms
the honest type — after all, the rational type can always mimic the honest-type’s strat-
egy. However, even in a minimal repeated relationship (i.e., over just two periods), the
honest-type manufacturer may outperform the rational type, even though, as before, the
rational type can always mimic the honest-type’s strategy. This happens when the project
is lucrative enough (low cost to value ratio, or large enough probability of realizing a ‘high’
investment value), or interactions are repeated several times. The following implications are
imminent: () Honesty is rewarded in a repeated innovation partnership — it emerges endoge-
nously as the optimal policy under very reasonable conditions. () The hold-up threat is
mitigated in two ways without resorting to complex and extreme measures suggested in the
economics literature: First, honest type manufacturers are honest throughout (and honesty
emerges endogenously as noted above). Second, rational type manufacturers play honest
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(i.e., they do not hold-up the supplier) in the earlier periods of a repeated relationship. As
the hold-up problem is mitigated, all parties are better off in equilibrium.
1.3 An Overview of Essay 3
In conventional reputation games, a rational player, whose type is unknown to the
other party, can selectively mimic a “committed” type in order to maximize his own profits.
Thus, the rational player, who is an unconstrained profit-maximizer, always outperforms the
type who is committed to (i.e., constrained by) a subset of strategies. This result hinges on
the tacit yet critical assumption that, barring one type’s (irrational) commitment, players
are otherwise perfectly rational. As we prove, this result does not hold when both types are
equally (even if so very mildly) bounded in their rationality in other dimensions: A type
committed to honesty can outperform the unconstrained profit-maximizer even though the
latter has access to a superset of strategies, including the option of mimicking the honest
type.
We develop a dynamic (multi-stage, multi-period), analytical model of incomplete
contracts between a principal and an agent in a repeated relationship. The principal is
either an unconstrained or an honest profit-maximizer. The unconstrained principal, aptly
characterized as ‘opportunistic’ or ‘self-interested with guile’ by Williamson (1985), maxi-
mizes his own payoff subject only to legal restraints. The honest principal (‘self-interested
without guile’, Williamson, 1985) honors his contractual obligations even in the absence of
legal restraints. This distinction between unconstrained and honest profit-maximizers par-
ticularly matters under incomplete contracts where, due to inadequate legal recourse under
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unforeseen contingencies, there can be a divergence between the letter and the spirit of the
contract. Although our modeling choices— a finite horizon, different ‘types’ of the principal,
incomplete and asymmetric information, and Bayesian players— are loosely similar to those
of a ‘reputations’ model (cf Mailath and Samuelson 2006), our model incorporates several
additional, demonstrably critical features such as honesty and a proclivity to tremble due to
bounded rationality. Our research makes several contributions, which we summarize below:
- Under plausible conditions, the ‘irrational’ (honest) type of principal strictly
outperforms the unconstrained type, even though the unconstrained principal can selec-
tively mimic the honest principal’s strategies. Thus, a commitment to honesty emerges
endogenously as the optimal policy.
- In traditional reputation models, the unconstrained type outperforms the com-
mitment type by selectively mimicking the latter’s strategies. Without adequate contextual
justification, the presumption of commitment types who are not profit-maximizers, and
whose payoffs are strictly dominated, appears arbitrary and contradicts Economic Darwin-
ism. The standard we propose for modeling irrationality to minimize arbitrariness is that
the constrained profit-maximizer (“commitment type”) should, at a minimum, outperform
the unconstrained type under plausible conditions, so that the specific type of commitment
assumed is not undermined by economic Darwinism.
- Conversely, given that some irrational traits (including ethical values such as
honesty) are commonly observed, despite incomplete contracts, our model postulates a set
of primitives (such as trembles) within the paradigm of economic modeling that explains
the survival of these traits. Hence, our research provides a bridge between normative ratio-
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nales for honesty— the province of Ethics — and profit-maximization, which is axiomatic in
Economics, by providing a compelling economic rationale for honesty.
- In sum, Rubinstein (1998) argues that “...substantive rationality is actually a
constraint on the modeler rather than an assumption about the real world...” Our proposed
standard relaxes this constraint on the modeler, in order to accommodate plausible models
of Bounded Rationality.
- Finally, in the context of incomplete contracts, we show that the principal can
induce the agent to make optimal relationship-specific investments, using simple, finite-
horizon contracts. Hence, we diverge from all previous explanations offered in the academic
literature (including relational contracts and conventional reputation models) for the ro-




Market Research in R&D Markets
2.1 Introduction
New products are plagued with uncertainty pertaining to characteristics of the
new product market (such as market size, customer preferences, etc.). A classical way to
mitigate this uncertainty is through Market Research (MR), which is defined as: “Gather-
ing, analyzing data about the market to reduce risk and enable better marketing decisions
to be made. It includes: estimates of market size and potential, identification of key mar-
ket characteristics and segments, forecasting market trends and gathering information on
existing and potential customers.” (The Institute of Sales & Marketing Management). The
importance given to market research by firms can be gauged from the fact that the global
spending on acquiring information on characteristics of a new-product market increased to
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a staggering $39 billion in year 20121. Without paying due diligence to MR, a firm could
assess accurately the market potential of a new product. In 2004, Coca-Cola introduced
C2 — a cola with half the calories and carbs but all the taste of the original Coke — pay-
ing only lip service to truly understanding what customers wanted. The product bombed.
As it turned out, customers desired full flavor with no calories or carbs, a niche that was
subsequently fulfilled by Coke Zero (Schneider and Hall 2011).
Off-late, in addition to market research, Competitive Intelligence (CI) — defined
by the American Marketing Association as: “The systematic gathering of data and informa-
tion about all aspects of competitors’ marketing and business activities for the purposes of
formulating plans and strategies and making decisions”— is garnering increased attention by
firms to acquire useful information about new products. For example, in 1997, a new line of
‘rising-crust pizzas’ promised to revolutionize frozen pizza, which, until then, often tasted
like the ‘cardboard box that it came in’. Kraft, one of the largest packaged-food company
in the US, was the pioneer who had perfected the rising-crust pizza after conducting ex-
tensive market research to ascertain customer preferences and likely demand. In 1997, the
company had been test-marketing the product under the brand name of DiGiorno. Around
that time, Schwan’s Sales Enterprises, a food company based in Marshall, MN, was also
working on its own line of rising-crust pizzas under the brand name of Freschetta. Schwan’s
wanted to know how aggressively Kraft planned to formally launch DiGiorno so that it
could tailor its own response. Schwan’s was interested in the production capacity of Kraft’s
plant that was to manufacture the DiGiorno’s line of pizzas. Schwan’s hired a professional




CI firm to investigate Kraft’s DiGiorno’s business. The CI firm estimated Kraft’s capacity
to be a staggering 50,000 pizzas a day. Spurred on by this covert and vital information
which revealed Kraft’s aggressive launch plans for DiGrigio, Schwan’s quickly scrambled
resources and committed to an aggressive launch as well of its own brand of Freschetta
pizzas. Although DiGrigio quickly became the number one brand in the 2.3 billion dollar
rising-crust-pizza category, the covert information obtained by Schwan’s helped establish
Freschetta as the No. 2 brand, behind DiGiorno, at the end of 1999. (Penenberg and Berry
2000, Black 2011)
Although, as compared to market research, competitive intelligence is regarded as
a relatively new discipline (Juhari and Stephens, 2006), it is growing rapidly and gaining
loyal patrons in today’s hyper-competitive business environment. Firms such as IBM, Coca
Cola, 3M, GE, Intel, P&G and others — have invested heavily in developing their own in-
house CI capabilities. Firms that do not possess in-house CI capabilities need not despair,
for they can always leverage professional CI consulting firms, such as Fuld & Company,
Ignite, Line of Sight, and CSIntell. A recent survey of 400 global companies by Fuld
&Company finds that despite the recent economy downturn, the number of companies that
spend over $1 million per year on competitive intelligence programs has doubled in the
past five years (Competitive Intelligence Global Benchmarking Project Update 20132). The
pharmaceutical industry has one of the most aggressive competitive intelligence programs:
the average yearly competitive intelligence budget for a pharmaceutical firm increasing




in just three years.3.
Unlike MR, which relies on willing customers to acquire information, competitive
intelligence ironically relies on the implicit ‘participation’ of scheming competitors — in the
sense that CI can always be neutered if the competitors protect and conceal their decisions
or information. And indeed some firms, notably Apple Computers, excel at such protection
and concealment. Apple takes ironclad measures, such as strictly restricting access to key
R&D areas, to using strong-arm tactics to gag employees from revealing information under
the threat of “termination and prosecution to the fullest extent that our lawyers can”, to
prevent information from leaking out to competitors, see Lashinsky (2012). As a result, the
effectiveness of CI is not guaranteed, but subject to the decisions and reactions from the
competitors in the market. Hence, key research questions that emerge are: Can CI emerge as
a viable information acquisition strategy even when competitors can conceal their decisions
and information? Can it ever replace market research, i.e., would firms ever choose CI over
MR? Which (or both, or neither) information acquisition strategies should firms pursue in
competitive R&D markets? How does the presence of competitive intelligence impact firms’
market research decisions, R&D decisions, and profitability?
To address these questions, we develop a dynamic model where two risk-neutral
firms compete for market shares in a new product market by making costly R&D invest-
ments. The market size of the new product is uncertain, and the final profits are a function
of the R&D investment levels and the realized market size. A key feature of our model is
that firms can actively manage their information — right from acquiring market informa-
tion through market research, or acquiring information on competitor’s decisions through
3http://finance.yahoo.com/news/Pharmaceutical-Competitive-bw-1347521081.html
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competitive intelligence, or both, to being able to conceal or reveal either component. To
focus on purely on the informational implications, all the above information management
activities, MR, CI, and concealment of information, are assumed to be costless in our model.
Additionally, our parsimonious model captures the key features of competitive R&D mar-
kets such as market uncertainty, information acquisition, firm heterogeneity, and sequence
of innovations.
Our study provides the following novel results. First, we show that under very
reasonable conditions, an asymmetric equilibrium exists (even when firms are symmetric ex
ante) in which one firm forgoes market research but successfully acquires information on
its rival though competitive intelligence, whereas the other firm does only market research.
Hence, we prove that competitive intelligence can emerge endogenously as an optimal and
viable information acquisition strategy even though () competitors can conceal their in-
formation; () market research is costless; and () market research can perfectly resolve
market uncertainty and can also provide additional value through a better understanding
of customer needs. In fact, we go one step further and prove that in this asymmetric equi-
librium, the firm doing CI not only ascertains the competitors investment, but it can also
perfectly infer the uncertain market size — hence, there is no information asymmetry in that
equilibrium, both firms know the true market size even when only one firm conducts market
research. We also show that competitive intelligence induces sequential innovations even
when firms are ex ante symmetric — i.e., in this asymmetric equilibrium, the firm with supe-
rior market information invests early, and is the pioneer, while the one with inferior market
information waits as a follower to conduct CI. We find that the possibility of conducting
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competitive intelligence blunts the incentives for market research — there exist conditions
under which neither firm does market research — for fear of potential competitive intelligence
by the rival — even if MR is free, can perfectly resolve market uncertainty and also reaps
additional benefits (such as higher margins) through a better understanding of customer
needs. And finally, we show that competitive intelligence can increase total industry profits
by endogenously creating a credible information channel between competing firms. To our
knowledge, this is the first paper that formally proves that competitive intelligence emerges
endogenously in competitive R&D markets and establishes its nuanced interactions with
the classical market research and investment decisions.
2.2 Literature Review
Many researchers in marketing and new product development highlight the impor-
tant role of market knowledge in new product development (e.g., Ottum and Moore 1997,
Li and Calantone 1998, Atuahene-Gima 2005). A large body of literature focuses on the
interplay between firms’ strategic market orientation and new product development (e.g.,
Atuahene-Gima 1995, Gatignon and Xuereb 1997, Spanjol et al 2011), and provides insights
on how gathering and using of different types of market information (e.g.,customer, com-
petitor, and technology) affect new product success. However, most of these papers consider
the relationship between market information and R&D investments or performance from a
single firm’s perspective, and only a few papers explicitly consider the strategic implication
of competition — that is, how the rivals’ actions may influence a firm’s incentive to gather
and use of market information in innovations. Lauga and Ofek (2009) study whether firms
19
should acquire information about customer’s horizontal or vertical preferences over two po-
tential attributes before their new product design decisions. They show that a firm may
choose not to acquire information even though the rival conducts such research and learn
the true customer preference. Since firms simultaneously choose product designs in their
model, firms cannot infer market information from the competitor’s innovation decisions
and there is no need for strategic information management. In a more related study, Ofek
and Turut (2008) consider the incentive to learn about uncertain market reward in a com-
petitive R&D market where an entrant compete with an incumbent. The entrant’s choice
between innovation and imitation may signal his market information to the incumbent. As
a result, the incumbent has less incentive to do market research, and the entrant may need
to strategically manage the market information in his innovation strategy. We also study
the market information acquisition and management in competitive R&D projects, but our
work differs from theirs in several ways. First, the information gathering about the competi-
tor in their model is one-way and exogenous — the incumbent always observes the entrant’s
new product development approach (i.e., innovation or imitation) while the entrant observes
nothing about the incumbent innovation strategy; by contrast, we allow both firms to do
competitive intelligence and monitor the competitor’s strategy, and what a firm observes
through competitive intelligence is endogenously determined by both firms. Second, they
only consider the case where two firms simultaneously determine the investment levels (af-
ter the entrant’s product development approach), while in our model firms can choose both
investment timing and levels and either simultaneous or sequential investments may occur.
Our work is also related to the vast stream of literature that articulates the advan-
20
tages and disadvantages of being first-movers or late-movers in competitive markets (e.g.,
Lieberman and Montgomery 1998, Shanker et al 1998, Boulding and Christen 2008). For
instance, as a pioneer, one may indelibly stamp ones’ brand name, formulate customer
preferences and market standard, choose preemptive positioning and thereby enjoy higher
profits than a “me too” follower. Of the more specific instance a disadvantage of being the
second mover is the “cost” associated with waiting for information as a late mover (Shanker
et al, 1998). However, as we show, the cost of waiting for information has an evil twin
in the form of the cost imposed on the leader of strategically managing the information
revealed to a waiting competitor. Hence, we complement the literature on the first/late
movers’ advantages and disadvantages by identifying (in most cases) a disadvantage for the
leader of moving early, on account of superior private information. Among the papers that
explicitly considers the strategic market entry decisions in the presence of competition, the
one that is most related to ours is Narasimhan and Zhang (2000). In their stylized model,
two competing firms can choose to enter a new market early when the market profitability is
still uncertain, or late after the uncertain resolves. They show that the optimal entry timing
strategy is determined by both the firm-specific pioneering advantages and laggard’s dis-
advantages; as a result, firms with strong pioneering advantages may choose to wait, while
firms with little pioneering advantages may choose to move early. Our paper echoes their
results that the heterogeneity in firms’ innovation capabilities or market powers impacts the
optimal investment timing when firms have symmetric market information, but our model
takes one step further in endogenizing the market information endowments. Our results
show that competitive intelligence is an indispensable driver for sequential innovations, and
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that market information asymmetry also impacts firms’ incentives to be a leader or a fol-
lower in a competitive new market. Our findings in identifying the linkage between market
information acquisition and sequential innovation strategies constitute a novel contribution
to existing literature.
Also related to our work is the stream of research that consider firms’ information
acquisition decisions regarding the uncertain market demand or uncertain production cost
in existing product markets. For example, Raju and Roy (2000) and Christen (2005) study
the incentives to acquire information about uncertain demand and cost respectively with
Bertrand competition, and Li et al (1987) about uncertain demand with Cournot competi-
tion. Most of these papers assume that, after the information acquisition, firms simultane-
ously and independently choose their price or quantity levels; hence, the strategic impact of
competition on the use of information is absent and there is no need to strategically manage
the acquired information. Anand and Goyal (2009) study both the acquisition and the man-
agement of demand information by the incumbent firm in a Cournot competition, when his
ordering quantity may be subsequently revealed by the supplier to an uninformed entrant.
In their model only one firm (the incumbent) can acquire information, and the sequence
of moves is exogenously given. Daughety and Reinganum (1994) consider a model similar
to ours in the Cournot setting. Two ex ante symmetric firms both can acquire demand
information, and they then can choose to produce in one of the two periods; if one firm
sets the quantity decision early and the other late, the latter firm can perfectly observe the
early mover’s quantity level and may infer the demand information. They find that when
the information acquisition is costly, asymmetric strategies can emerge in equilibrium — one
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firm acquires information and produces first, and the other does not acquire information
and produces late. Our model is more general than theirs: firms can be either ex ante
symmetric or asymmetric; also, the information about the competitor’s strategy does not
automatically reveal across periods in our model, but firms can conduct competitive intelli-
gence to gather it. Our results show that even though it is costless to acquire information,
firms may choose asymmetric information acquisition strategy and sequential innovations.
In summary, our study integrates the market information acquisition and manage-
ment strategies with R&D investment decisions in competitive markets. Our novel model
has the following essential features: () We endogenize the information endowment of firms
by allowing each firm to select one or more information acquisition approaches: market
research which helps firms to proactively understand the market characteristics and resolve
market uncertainties, and competitive intelligence which enables firms to monitor the com-
petitors’ actions and reactively infer competitors’ private information. () We explicitly
consider strategic information management for firms — a firm that acquires information
through market research has the option to either reveal or hide his information especially
when the competitor indulges in competitive intelligence. (Such information management
potentially gives rise to a signaling game between the firms.) () We endogenize the tim-
ing of investments: either firm can be the first-mover (leader) or second-mover (follower) in
R&D investments. () Our model explicitly incorporates firm-specific differences such as
the ability in amplifying the value generated from market research.
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2.3 The Model
Two firms, indexed by  and  compete in the market for a new product. Let
 ≥ 0 and  ≥ 0 be the R&D investments of firm  and firm  respectively. The
monetary costs of these investments are linear and identical for both firms: () = ,
for  ∈ ( ). The R&D investments of the firms determine the ‘attractiveness’ of their
products in the market, which in-turn determines the market shares through the well-known
Market Share Attraction model, c.f. Bell et al. (1975).4 Given the firms’ investment levels










The market size of the new product market is uncertain and can be either ‘high’
or ‘low’. Let ̃ denote the uncertain market size, then ̃ can be either low () with
probability , or it can be high (  ) with probability (1− ). These priors are
common knowledge. We can denote the new product market as (   ).
4The market share attraction model (hereafter, MSA) is well established in both the marketing and
operations literature — see, for instance, Bell et al. (1975)  Karnani (1985), Monohan (1987) and Ofek and
Sarvary (2003) in marketing; and Erat and Kavadias (2006), Federgruen and Yang (2009) in operations.
MSA has an appealing structure in that the market share (the variable of interest) is based on “us/(us
+them)” structure of investments, commonly seen in other models such as the much celebrated multinomial
logit. In fact, in several markets, MSA has better predictive power than other models, cf. Naert and
Weverbergh (1981). The R&D investments, such as  in our model, typically subsume all activities in
developing and introducing new products, including applied research, product specification, pilot plant or
prototype construction, investment in plant and equipment, and manufacturing and marketing startup. An
alternative interpretation of the market share model is that of a ‘contest’ where firms compete for leadership
in the market for a new product; the winning probabilities are the same as the market shares in the model
(c.f. Ofek and Sarvary, 2003).
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Before firms make their investment decisions, they can conduct market research,
competitive intelligence, both, or none. For  ∈ ( ), we denote a firm ’s market research
decision as  if it conducts market research, or   if it does not conduct market research;
and similarly,  denotes that firm  conducts competitive intelligence whereas  denotes
no competitive intelligence undertaken by firm . To ensure a fair comparison between
the two information acquisition strategies, the cost of acquiring information through either
market research or competitive intelligence is normalized to zero.
Market research serves two purposes. It perfectly resolves the uncertainty pertain-
ing to market size ̃; additionally, it also allows firms to gain a better understanding of
customer needs (according to definition by AMA), which will enhance the value that firms
can generate from one unit of sale of their products. For instance, in the pizza example
discussed in the introduction, Kraft conducted extensive market research to not only under-
stand how big the market really was for rising-crust pizzas, but it also executed elaborate
studies to critically understand key customer needs and expectations from frozen pizzas,
and how such needs can be met with the rising-crust variation. Microsoft and Silicon Graph-
ics Inc. gained huge market success by proactively studying customers and incorporating
customer preferences in their new products, Li and Calantone (1998). In fact, Microsoft
attributes its huge success to a ‘vigorous pursuit of customer knowledge in its new product
development’, ibid. Hence, a rigorous understanding of customer needs through market
research by a firm  ∈ ( ) would amplify the value generated from the same customer
base. We denote this value “amplification factor” of market research for a firm by  ≥ 1
for  ∈ ( ). A higher value of  implies a market where customers have strong idio-
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syncratic needs which, when captured in the new product, generate a higher value, whereas
 = 1 implies that the opposite case when there is no specific advantage to understanding
finer nuances of the market, or if the firm is inept at capturing it, and the only information
of value is statistical data on market size. Note that firms only can obtain this amplification
factor  by conducting market research. Also, firms differ in their MR abilities: although
both firms are equally adept at inferring the statistical market size, the parameter  is
firm specific, i.e., one firm may be better at understanding customer needs and market idio-
syncrasies than the other firm. Without loss of generality, we assume that the firm  the
Stronger firm, is better at understanding customer needs than firm  the W eaker firm;
hence, we assume that  ≥  
Hence, the profit of a firm that does MR is:
 (|) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
 −  with probability (1− )
 −  with probability 
  ∈ {} 
where  are the market shares determined by equations 2.1 and 2.2 depending on whether
a firm is Weak or Strong.5
A firm that does not conduct market research cannot directly ascertain the true
market size — although it may be able to infer the true market size through competitive
intelligence, see next subsection — and it certainly cannot obtain the amplification factor 
associated with market research. Hence, the expected profit obtained by a firm that does
5Although the Market Share Attraction model has several nice properties, a very unsatisfying quirk of
the model is that, when  = 1 the expected value of information is zero. That is, when  = 1 a firm
generates equal profit (in expectation) with or without information on the true market size, which renders
the firm indifferent towards acquiring information. This is clearly contrary to practice. The parameter 
addresses this issue: with   1 ceteris paribus, a firm is better off acquiring information on the market
size (due to the amplification in value induced by ) than to remain uninformed. Moreover,   1 renders
our setup more conservative by tipping our model against finding support for CI. That is, despite exogenous
benefits of exclusively acquiring information though market research (when   1), we find that a firm may
forego market research in favor of CI.
26





= ̃ −    ∈ {}
where  is once again the market shares determined by equations 2.1 and 2.2 depending
on whether a firm is Weak or Strong.6
A firm can also conduct competitive intelligence (CI) to obtain information on
the competitor’s decisions. Consistent with market research, we assume that CI perfectly
reveals the rival’s investment, (−), unless the opponent takes measures to conceal its
investment. We assume that any such concealment of information is perfect and costless.
In effect, we make the following three assumptions regarding the information ac-
quisition strategies:
Assumption 1: Market research is costless and perfectly resolves uncertainty on
the market size. In addition firms can amplify market value ( ≥ 1) through a better
understanding of customer needs.
Assumption 2: Competitive intelligence is costless and perfectly reveals the rival
firm’s decisions such as the investment, unless the rival takes measures to conceal its in-
vestment information.7
Assumption 3: A firm can perfectly conceal its investment information from the
rival’s CI. Moreover, any such concealment is costless.
6In effect, similar to Jensen and Meckling (1992) and Anand and Mendelson (1997), we parse information
on potential market value into two components: The first, ̃, is statistical data on market size which is
transferrable to competing firms, or it can be inferred, such as through CI; and the other, (− 1) ̃ is the
specific knowledge on consumer tastes, which typically gets embedded in the various nebulous ‘organizational
routines’ (cf. Nelson and Winter 1982), and hence is nontransferrable. A firm undertaking MR accrues both
components and hence competes for a potential value of ̃; whereas the firm not doing MR can, at best,
infer the true market size ̃ through CI, but can never realize the specific and nontransferrable component
(− 1) ̃
7Much of the information on competitors can typically be gleaned from public channels, such as company
websites, news releases, patent disclosures, social media, etc., Sreenivasan (1998). Hence, the default option,
unless firms conceal information deliberately, like Apple does, is that CI is successful.
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The Sequence of Moves
Firms in our model make four decisions: () whether to conduct market research;
() whether to do competitive intelligence; () how much and when to invest in R&D; and
() whether to conceal information on the R&D investment. These decisions emerge over
three stages of the game. The first is the Market Research (MR) Stage, the second is the
CI & Investment Stage and the third is the Payoff Stage. See Figure 2.1.
In the MR stage, firms decide whether to conduct market research, and if they do,
they know the realized market size —  =  or  In addition, they amplify the value
from  to  through a better understanding of customer needs. At the end of the MR
stage, firms’ decisions on whether to conduct market research become public information.
Next, firms decide whether to do CI — this decision marks the start in the CI &
Investment Stage, when and how much to invest in their R&D, and whether to conceal their
investment decisions. A firm deciding to do CI aims to observe the rival firm’s investment
decisions, and he must invest after the rival firm to meaningfully utilize that information
to shape its own investment. Hence, for ease of exposition, the CI & Investment stage is
divided into two epochs — ‘Early’ and ‘Late’. Firms can invest either in the Early or Late
epoch (both not in both). A firm’s CI monitors and reveals the rival’s investment decisions
(including both the investment timing and level) at the end of each epoch unless the rival
firm chooses to conceal its investment decision (in which case, CI reveals nothing). (Note
that investing late is akin to concealment since it does not allow the rival firm enough time
to conduct CI and then also invest. Essentially, what this implies is that firms can always





















Figure 2.1: Sequence of events.
analysis we bundle moving late with concealing investment since both these actions induce
exactly the same equilibrium outcomes.) Breaking the stage into ‘Early’ and ‘Late’ epochs
captures praxis in that not all firms invest at the same time. Moreover, it allows us to tease
out sequential investments that can evolve endogenously through CI.
Finally, in the payoff stage, firms introduce the products in the market and the
payoffs are realized based on the market share model. (Although firms may invest sequen-
tially in the CI & Investment stage, the final payoffs are independent of whether the firms
introduce the products in the market sequentially or not.)
Notice that the sequence of moves is fluid, especially in the CI & Investment stage,
in that the actual timing of investments, and whether firms conceal these, are locked only
in equilibrium. (In fact, we can even leave the sequence of the three stages (with their
embedded decisions) unspecified, and the equilibrium sequence and decisions will evolve
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endogenously.) In contrast, in most such game-theoretic models, the timing of moves is
neatly laid out by the modeler — hence, firms are called upon to make moves in a tightly
controlled and exogenously specified sequence (it is unlikely that firms in the real world
operate through such dues ex machina).
2.3.1 Overview of the Analysis
Each firm starts the game with the identical information endowment: they are both
uninformed about the true market size and have the same priors on e (i.e.,     and
). However, before firms make their investment decisions, they can alter their information
endowments through the various decisions that they make, specifically, whether to do MR
and whether to do CI. But, the benefits of acquiring information through either channels do
not accrue without trade-offs which must be factored in. Consider market research first. If
a firm conducts market research, it then knows the realized market size, which can be used
to tailor its investment. However, its investment decisions may be vulnerable to the rival’s
competitive intelligence and so can be the information on the realized market size which
may be inferred by the firm undertaking CI. The trade-off for competitive intelligence is
by no means simpler. With competitive intelligence, a firm may observe the competitor’s
investment level, and, may even be able to infer the realized market size. However, unlike
market research, the effectiveness of competitive intelligence relies on the ‘participation’ of
the competitor — the competitor can always neuter the threat of competitive intelligence by
simply concealing its investment, or revealing the investments but so fudging them so as to
render the embedded information on the realized market size indecipherable.
Hence, strategic tensions are considerably exacerbated since firms not only have
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to react to the rival’s investment, but they also need to anticipate and factor the rival’s
information acquisition and concealment decisions, and all of these forge the firm’s own
strategy in terms of investments (timing and level), the channel(s) through which to acquire
information and whether to conceal information.
The central thesis of our analysis, therefore, is this complex interplay among the
information acquisition strategies, and their interaction with R&D investment strategies
(both timing and level). On a broad note, all firms have conjectures about the other firm’s
strategies — such as whether the rival will do competitive intelligence and whether the
rival will conceal information — and these conjectures must be correct in equilibrium. But
at a more atomic level, the choices of information acquisition strategy can be such that it
renders one firm better informed than its rival; hence, firms must form beliefs on their rival’s
information endowment, and then decide their own strategies as a function both of these
beliefs as well as the rival’s strategies. Hence, the equilibrium concept that we invoke is the
Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole 1991), which specifies how
beliefs evolve through the rival’s strategies (in a Bayesian fashion to the extent possible),
and then how strategies, as a function of these beliefs, must be sequentially rational. We
will first analyze the CI & Investment subgame, and then fold it back to analyze the meta
MR stage game.
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2.4 The Competitive Intelligence and R&D Investment Strate-
gies
Based on firms’ market research decisions, four scenarios can arise at the beginning
of this stage: ) ( ) — both firm conduct MR and are informed about the realized
market size; ) (  ) — both firms are uninformed and only know the priors; )
(  ) — only firm  conducts MR and is informed about the realized market size,
while firm  remains uninformed; and ) (  ) — only firm  conducts MR and
knows the realized market size. In the first two cases, the two firms choose symmetric
market research strategies, and in the last two cases, the firms choose asymmetric market
research strategies. (However, because firms are ex ante identical, both cases () and ()
have identical analysis and are therefore considered together.) In the rest of this section,
we specify how the equilibrium strategies unfold for each of these four cases.
2.4.1 Symmetric Market Research Strategies: (), ()
If firms choose the same market research strategies, then at the beginning of the CI
& Investment stage they will have identical information about the market size (i.e., either
both know the market size or both do not). In addition, if both do market research, each
firm will obtain the amplification factor ,  ∈ {} and because firms have different
abilities, market research can possibly generate asymmetry in otherwise symmetric firms. In
either case, CI serves only to reveal the rival’s investment − — the transferrable information
on market-size potentially embedded in the investment is either absent (when neither firm
does MR in ( )) or is already known to the firm (when both do MR in (  )).
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A firm can always conduct CI to observe the competitor’s investment (−), and
then use this information to accordingly tailor its own investment. As can be seen from the
best response functions below, each firm’s optimal investment level is a concave function of
the rival’s −: it should invest low when the rival choose a very low or very high investment
level, and it should invest relatively high otherwise.










But on the flip side, undertaking CI also implies waiting for the rival to invest
(otherwise CI is meaningless), observing the rival’s investment decisions, and only then
deciding one’s own. (Essentially, conducting CI implies being a follower in the investment
game.) Hence, a firm, by investing early and not concealing information, can push its rival
who undertakes CI into a corner by making large aggressive investments. (Indeed, as can be
easily shown, firms’ profit decrease in the rival firm’s investment.) The following proposition
resolves this tension and delineates the equilibrium when both firms have identical market
research strategies.
Proposition 2.1 When firms choose symmetric market research strategies in the MR stage,
i.e., both do market research (  ) or neither does market research (  ), then:
() If they have equal MR capability ( =  ) there is no unique equilibrium.
But in any equilibrium, the firms make identical investments and generate identical pay-
offs while sharing the market equally independent of their CI and information concealment
strategies;
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() If both firms do market research and have different MR capability    
the unique Pareto optimal equilibrium is that firm does not do competitive intelligence and
invests early without concealing its investment, whereas firm  does competitive intelligence
and, hence, invests late. Moreover, in this equilibrium, firm  invests more, captures higher
market share and earns higher profit than firm  .
Part (i) of Proposition 2.1 indicates that when both firms remain symmetric, either
when they do not conduct MR or both conduct MR but have equal MR capabilities (identical
), the two firms invest identically, get equal market shares and earn the same profit
independent of whether they conduct CI or conceal information. In essence, when firms are
symmetric, firms are indifferent between investing early or late. Hence, in our model there
are no endogenous advantages to investing early or late, as is the case with sequential-move
games in the literature on Cournot and Bertrand competition; nor does our model impose
exogenous first-mover or second-mover advantages, as in models of product development, cf.
Narasimhan and Zhang (2000). This is especially appealing since the driver of any induced
sequentially in moves can now be isolated easily — such as difference in , explained next
— and more importantly, asymmetric information on market size, which is elaborated in the
next section.
However, when firm ’s MR capability is higher than firm  ’s (   ), as
in part (ii) of Proposition 2.1, the indifference breaks down — the unique equilibrium that
emerges is that the weaker firm invests in the Early epoch without concealing its investment,
whereas the stronger firm invests in the Late epoch while undertaking CI to monitor the
weak firm’s investment. Hence, sequential innovation, with a first and a second mover (who
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does CI), emerges endogenously when firms have heterogeneous MR capabilities. We call
this the capability effect, and the intuition is as follows. The stronger firm has an inherent
advantage over the weaker firm through  which amplifies the efficacy of its investments
— for instance, for the same investments, the stronger firm garners a higher market value
than the weaker firm. Hence, the dominant strategy of the weak firm is to move Early,
and to not conceal its investment from the strong firm to show its commitment to ‘set the
tone’ — a low bar, in fact — for the competition. And the stronger firm itself prefers moving
Late and conducting CI since the stronger firm can then tailor its investment according
to the weak firm’s to optimize profit. In contrast, by not doing CI, the strong firm will
equivalently ‘play blind’ in a simultaneous move game (whether it moves Early or Late)
and end up over-investing without commensurate gains in market shares. (Notice that in
the market share model, both firms investing high may not necessarily increase market
share, but it certainly increases costs. For instance, a doubling of the investment by both
firms will not change market shares but will certainly increase costs and lower profits.)
Hence, equilibrium delineated in part () of the proposition, where the weak firms moves
Early, does not conceal its investment whereas the strong firm conducts CI and moves Late,
emerges uniquely and, in fact, is Pareto optimal.
Our results mirror praxis. In the Internet browsers competition, Netscape rushed
to market much faster than its stronger rival Microsoft, believing that “the new [weaker]
company would have to move first, or else Microsoft could destroy it” (Quittner and Slatalla
1998). Coco-cola has often “let others come out, stand back and watch, and then see what
it takes to take the category over” (Schnaars 1994). On the theoretical side, our results
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echo Narasimhan and Zhang (2000) in that firm-specific heterogeneity impacts the timing
of entry into a new product market.
The above proposition shows that CI endogenously emerges as an equilibrium
when there is no information asymmetry, i.e., the equilibrium in which one firm voluntarily
reveals its investment (even when it can costlessly conceal it) and the other firm taps into
this information through CI (and thereby acting as a follower in the investment game)
emerges endogenously. This is the unique equilibrium when firms differ in MR capability,
even if the difference is small, and one of the equilibria when firms have exactly the same
capabilities. In effect, this equilibrium is the only robust equilibrium (since this is the
only equilibrium that survives if the game, where firms have exactly the same capability,
is perturbed ever so slightly). Moreover, CI endogenously serves as a channel to establish
credible commitments between competing firms — the weaker firm can credibly demonstrate
its low investment and ease the intensity of competition in the market, because the stronger
firm’s competitive intelligence apparatus will surely verify this commitment.
2.4.2 Asymmetric Market Research Strategies: (), ()
Asymmetric market research strategies, i.e., ( ) or (  ), induce
asymmetric information on the market size between the firms — the firm having undertaken
market research, the informed firm, knows the realized market size,  or ; whereas the
firm not undertaking market research, the uninformed firm, only has priors on market size.
We refer to the informed firm as a low type if it learns that the realized market size is low,
, and a high type if it learns that the realized market size is high,  .
One key benefit of conducting market research is that it acquires accurate infor-
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mation about the realized market size, which in turn can be used to tailor one’s R&D
investment. In our model, everything else equal, the optimal R&D investments increase in
market size — a firm optimally invests more when the market size is high, and less when the
market size is low. However, this very act of tailoring investments to underlying market
size by the informed firm would reveal the embedded market information to the uninformed
firm conducting CI, allowing the uninformed firm to free-ride on the informed firm’s market
research. In our model, the formation of a signaling game is plausible wherein the informed
firm moves early and reveals its investment, and the uninformed firm moves late, conducts
CI and attempts to infer the realized market size through the informed firm’s investment.
One striking/unique features of our model is that such a signaling subgame is not assumed
exogenously, as is the case with most papers that model and analyze information flows, cf.
Anand and Goyal (2009) — there is no ex ante guarantee in our model that the informed
firm will invest early and not conceal its investment, nor that the uninformed firm will
conduct competitive intelligence and invest late — rather signaling evolves endogenously, if
at all, through the strategies of both the informed firm (whether to invest early and conceal
investment) and the uninformed firm (whether to conduct CI and invest late).
And if such a signaling game is indeed generated, the trade-off for the informed
firm is the same as the one in a typical signaling game: Because the investments of firms are
strategic substitutes, i.e., a firm’s profit decreases in the rival’s investment, the informed
firm prefers that the uninformed rival believes that the market size is low and thereby
makes low investment, which reaps higher profit for the informed firm. Consequently, the
low type informed firm has incentives to ‘assist’ the uninformed rival to correctly infer the
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low market size, whereas the high type informed firm would like to erroneously convince
the uninformed firm that the market size is low. Hence, in the parlance of Game Theory,
specifically, the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, the informed firm’s choice of investment
induces beliefs for the rival firm undertaking CI to infer the realized market size, and both
types of informed firm prefer to induce beliefs that the market size is low.
Indeed, signaling may not arise at all if the informed firm simply conceals its
investment, thereby also concealing the embedded information on the realized market size.
This is different from extant literature, where concealing investments is either not allowed
or is not successful (typically because of information leakage). Consequently, the only
way in the literature to conceal and protect (private) information is to actually ‘fudge’
decisions such as investments (or related entities such as ‘material quantities’), for instance
by choosing the amount of investment independent of the underlying market information,
so that the uninformed firm is unable to tease out the private information from the level of
investments of the informed firm. Hence, a rather unappealing way to protect one’s private
information in extant literature is to not use that information. In contrast, in our model,
we assume that firms can conceal information by simply concealing investments while still
using the information about the realized market size to tailor the investments.
In essence, in our model, firms can do all of the following: () reveal investment as
well as the underlying information of realized market size by choosing a distinct investment
level for each possible market size (the separating equilibrium); () reveal investment but
conceal market-information by choosing the same investment level independent of the re-
alized market size (i.e., throw away the private information about the realized market size
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through the pooling equilibrium); or () conceal investments (and hence the private infor-
mation about the realized market size), but still utilize the information about the realized
market size to optimally tailor investments. Extant literature allows only () and ()  but
prohibits ().
The following proposition derives and establishes the Perfect Bayesian Nash equi-
librium when only one firm acquires information, in terms of whether firms conceal infor-
mation, whether they conduct CI, and their investment levels and timings.
Proposition 2.2 When only one firm conducts market research, there exist thresholds  ≥
1 and 0    1 such that the Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the CI & Investment
stage satisfies the following: For  ∈ {},
() If  ≤ , the firm who conducts market research (the informed firm) invests
early without concealing its investment, and the firm who does not conduct market research
(the uninformed firm) does competitive intelligence and invests late. Furthermore, if  ≤
, the informed firm plays a separating strategy, i.e., it uniquely tailors its investment
according to the realized market size; hence, the uninformed firm can perfectly infer the
realized market size from the informed firm’s investment. If   , the informed firm
plays a Pareto dominant pooling strategy, i.e., it chooses the same investment level for
both market sizes; hence the uninformed firm cannot infer the realized market size from the
informed firm’s investment.
() If   , the uninformed firm invests early and does not conceal its invest-
ment, and the informed firm does competitive intelligence and invests late.
Consider first the special case  = 1, which implies that market information
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collected by the informed firm is purely the nonspecific statistical data on market size
with no value to the specific knowledge on consumer needs and tastes. In this special
case, the only asymmetry between the informed firm and the uninformed firm is that the
informed firm knows the underlying market size whereas the uninformed firm does not.
Because  = 1 ≤ , equilibrium specified in part (i) of the above proposition is played
where a signaling game is endogenously formed. Consider first the case when  ≤ ̄ so
that the separating equilibrium is played. Under this equilibrium, the informed firm invests
early and, not only does it not conceal its investment, the informed firm, in fact, tailors
the investment according to the market size (high investment for high market size and
low investment for low market size). Consequently, the uninformed firm, by investing late,
successfully conducts competitive intelligence and infers the embedded information about
the realized market size in the informed firm’s investment. In effect, there is no information
asymmetry in equilibrium. However, the low type informed firm has to lower its investment
(compared to what is optimal if both firms were informed) in order to separate out from
the high type informed firm (the investment has to be low enough to dissuade the high type
from mimicking the low type).
When   ̄ both types of informed firm invest the same amount regardless
whether the realized market size is high or low, i.e., the investment level of the informed
firm is agnostic to the underlying market size. Hence, the informed firm, although it reveals
the investment to the uninformed firm, suppresses the embedded information on market
size. But the downside is that the informed firm too is unable to utilize market information
since its own investment does not reflect the underlying state of the market.
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The trade-off between pooling and separating as a function of  is clear. For a
high , i.e., when priors for low market size are strong, the uninformed firm’s investment is
anyway small — hence, the low type informed firm pools with the high type informed firm
rather than lowering its investment suboptimally in an effort to separate out. But when 
is small, i.e, when the priors favor a high market size, the low type informed firm prefers to
separate to prevent a high investment (based on priors) by the uninformed firm.
It is not surprising that the uninformed firm undertakes competitive intelligence,
because it can potentially infer the market size by observing the informed rival’s investment
decision (and notice that = 1 there is no built-in disadvantage for investing late anyway).
It also makes sense that the low-type informed firm prefers to help the uninformed rival to
correctly infer the low market size by revealing its investment; hence, the low type informed
firm prefers to move early and reveal the investment. But it is indeed interesting that
the high-type informed firm chooses to reveal its investment, especially in the separating
equilibrium which also reveals that market size is high, despite knowing that the uninformed
firm will do CI and despite being able to costlessly conceal its investment. The underlying
reason is that in light of the low type informed firm’s strategy of always revealing the
investment to the uninformed firm, the very act of concealing investment by the high type
informed firm convinces the uninformed firm that market size must be high, thus unraveling
any attempt by the high type to conceal market information through concealing investment.8
8This unraveling of the high type’s strategy of concealing investment, when the low type always reveals
his own, does not depend on their being only two type. Here is a quick intuition. Suppose there are three
types of informed firm, i.e.. the suppose the market size can be low, medium or high. Then the low type,
as before, always reveals investment. Hence, if the medium and high types conceal their investment, the
uninformed firm will invest based on posterior beliefs that the market is medium or high. But this investment
by the uninformed firm can be profitably lowered by the medium type by revealing that market is medium.
Hence, any concealment will reveal the market size to be high, thereby unraveling the strategy of concealing
investment by any type.
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Thus, by muting the capability advantage (by imposing  = 1) we distill and
isolate the “information effect” that drives the informed firm to reveal its investment to
the uninformed firm so that a signaling game is endogenously formed. (Note that the such
signaling, where the informed firm invests earlier than the uninformed firm, is not always
formed, such as under conditions of part () of the above proposition.) But whether the
underlying market size is conveyed to the uninformed firm depends on whether  is above
or below a certain threshold ̄
However, as  increases, the informed firm gets ‘stronger’ since the same in-
vestment reaps in higher value. Hence, with increasing  the uninformed firm faces an
onslaught of highly efficacious investments from the informed firm who, by investing early,
can crush the uninformed rival, especially when    To avoid being the follower to a
highly capable informed firm, the uninformed firm (which is also weaker since it does not
enjoy) invests early to set the tone of competition, very much like part () of Proposition
2.1, even if it cannot ascertain the informed firm’s investment and hence with no chance
of inferring the information about the realized market size. Given that they cannot signal
low demand anymore, both types of informed firm invest late, successfully conduct CI while
concealing their investments, and hence, private information about the realized market size.
So far we have identified the equilibrium outcomes in the CI & Investment stage
for all the four possible outcomes that can arise after the MR stage. Our analysis shows
that competitive intelligence emerges endogenously — there is always an equilibrium where
one firm successfully conducts CI with the implicit participation of the rival who volun-
tarily reveals information. And in many reasonable cases, CI reveals not only the rival’s
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investment, but the embedded information on market size as well. Our insights do not rely
on there being only two states of market size (high or low), or that information collected
through either MR or CI is perfect and noiseless.
Creating and establishing credible commitments can be notoriously difficult. More-
over, credibly exchanging information often requires vetting by neutral third parties. In
contrast, we show that CI endogenously establishes a credible channel of communication
between competing firms, which can be used to convey investments and market information
— as a consequence, it serves as an effective commitment device without the need for third
parties. Moreover, CI, together with the capability effect and information effects, induce
sequential investments: firms with superior market information and weaker capability tend
to speed to the new product market, while firms with less market information and stronger
competitive skills are more likely to wait and observe. Hence, our results provide a new
rational explanation to the mixed observations of first-mover and second-mover advantages
in practice.
2.5 The Market Research Strategy
As our analysis clearly shows, information about the realized market size is critical
in determining firms’ competitive intelligence and investment strategies, and their payoffs in
a competitive new product market. Information on market characteristics, such as market
size, is typically not exogenously given — rather, firms actively conduct market research to
gather and analyze information about customers and other characteristics in a new product
market (c.f. Ottum and Moore 1997). Daughety and Reinganum (1994) also suggests, “...if
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asymmetries [between competitors] in information [about market demand] persist, there
should be a reason and the reason should involve choice, possibly in conjunction with, but
certainly not entirely supplanted by, chance.”
In this section, we analyze the firms’ strategies in the market research stage, given
the outcomes in the CI & Investment stage. The trade-offs in conducting MR are self-
evident and yet subtle at the same time. Clearly, acquiring information yields two benefits:
it yields accurate information on the market size, and it generates the value amplification
factor . But at the same time, these decisions are made in a competitive market where
the firm’s information on the realized market size, is vulnerable to CI by the rival. This in
turn imposes a burden of appropriately managing the market information, a la Proposition
2.2. At first glimpse, it might suggest that CI might be an inferior information acquisition
strategy even if it infers the market size successfully because it would not be able to generate
the amplification factor  for firms. But this strategy can indeed be optimal even when
acquiring information through MR is free, as the following Proposition proves.
Proposition 2.3 For a given new product market (   ), the Nash Equilibrium mar-
ket research strategies satisfy the following.
() If both firms’ value amplification factors from market research are very small,
(i.e., 1 ≤  ≤  ≤ 0), the unique equilibrium is (  ) where neither firm
conducts market research.
() If both firms’ value amplification factors from market research are moderate,
(i.e., 0   ≤ ∗ and 0   ≤ ∗), there are two asymmetric equilibria ( )
and (  ) where either firm but exactly one conducts market research.
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() If the weaker firm  ’s value amplification factor from market research is
very small and the stronger firm ’s is not too large, or if weaker firm  ’s is moderate
while the stronger firm ’s is large (i.e., 1 ≤  ≤ 0   ≤ , or, 0 ≤  ≤ ∗
and ∗   ≤  ), the unique equilibrium is ( ) where firm S conducts market
research and firm W does not.
() If firm ’s value amplification factor from market research is very large, or if
both firms’ value amplification factors from market research are large enough (i.e.   ,
or,   
∗
 and   
∗
), the unique equilibrium is ( ) where both firm
conducts market research.
Each firm needs to evaluate the following three forces associated with market re-
search: () the value amplification factor from market research, ; () the potential burden
of strategically managing the information on market size if the competitor chooses not to
conduct market research and a signaling game is to be played (i.e., when the firm’s own
 ≤ ), as for the informed firm in proposition 2.2; and () the potentially missed op-
portunity of forgoing market research and profiting from the competitor’s under-investment
distortion if the competitor chooses to conduct market research (when the competitor’s
 ≤ ), as for the uninformed firm in proposition 2.2. The interplay between the benefits
and the potential drawbacks of market research critically depends on firms’ value amplifi-
cation factor from market research, . Figure 2.2 below visually demonstrates the above
proposition, along with the respective competitive intelligence strategies under each equilib-
rium. The 450 line represents the case where the firms have symmetric value amplification























Figure 2.2: Equilibrium information acquisition strategies.
for either firm to offset the information management burden, while ∗ and 
∗
 are the
minimum levels of  and  for the benefit of higher market value to overweigh the
potentially value of forgoing market research and profiting from the informed competitor’s
investment distortion. Note that for   , there will be no signaling game even under an
asymmetric market research structure, so the latter two forces will be absent.
In Region A, for either firm, the value amplification factor from market research
is very small (1 ≤  ≤  ≤ 0). In light of the limited value of market research,
it is a dominant strategy for a firm to not conduct market research, because the onus
of strategically managing private information on market size is too much of a burden if
the competitor is expected to forgo market research and it is more lucrative to force the
competitor to distort the investment decisions if the competitor conducts market research.
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Hence, as in part () of the above proposition, ( ) is the unique nash equilibrium.
In the CI stage, proposition 2.1 is played where, given the symmetry of firms, all possible
sequences and CI strategies are possible.
In Region B, the value amplification factor from market research for both firms
are large enough to offset the information management burdens, so both firms are willing
to conduct market research even if the competitor is expected to forgo market research;
however, the benefits from market research are still smaller than the profits from the rival’s
investment distortion in an asymmetric information structure, so the firms still prefer to
only do competitive intelligence if the competitor is expected to conduct market research.
Hence, as in part () of the above proposition, there are two asymmetric equilibria where
exactly one firm acquires information from market research. In the CI stage, part () of the
proposition 2.2 is played where the uninformed firm undertakes competitive intelligence to
observe the competitor’s investment actions and infer market size information. Interestingly
enough, the weaker firm  with  may be the one to acquire information from market
research, while the stronger firm  with  may choose to forgo the free market research
and only rely on the competitor’s signals.
In Region C, the unique equilibrium is that, the stronger firm conducts market
research, and the weaker firm  infers the market size information through competitive
intelligence. The underlying reason is two folded. In the bottom rectangle part of the
region (1 ≤   0   ≤ ), it is a dominant strategy for the weaker firm  to
not conduct market research due to its small  , while the stronger firm  prefers to
conduct market research. In contrast, in the top part of the region (0 ≤  ≤ ∗ and
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∗   ≤ ), it is a dominant strategy for the stronger firm  to always conduct market
research because is large enough (larger than
∗
) to offset either potential drawbacks of
market research discussed above; anticipating that the rival is acquiring information through
market research, the weaker firm  prefers to just conduct competitive intelligence to infer
information from the rival because   
∗
 .
Finally, as continues to increases and  
∗
 (i.e., in the top part of region
D), the weaker firm  is also not willing to give up on the benefits of market research,
so both firms conducting market research is the unique equilibrium. Interestingly, in the
bottom part of region D, the weaker firm  also chooses to acquire information through
market research even though its value amplification factor from market research is very
small. This is because, we have    so that the stronger firm  always conducts market
research, and it can successfully hide its investment and avoid the information management
burden if it is the only informed firm, as per part (ii) of proposition 2.2. Hence, for the
weaker firm  , both potential drawbacks of market research are absent as there will be no
signaling game to be played, and it should also conduct market research to learn the realized
market size to tail its R&D investment. Because both firms conducting market research is
the unique equilibrium, in the CI stage, proposition 2.1 is played where the weaker firm 
invests first and the stronger firm  invests late and does competitive intelligence.
Corollary 2.1 In a given new product market, the stronger firm S is more likely to conduct
market research and invest early. Even when firms are ex ante identical, they may rely on
different information acquisition strategies to resolve market uncertainty.
Our equilibrium result shows that firms may acquire market information through
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different channels. Clearly, the firm with higher value amplification factor from market
research has more incentive to do market research. However, it is also possible that the
firm with weaker value amplification factor from market research chooses to conduct mar-
ket research, while the firm with stronger value amplification factor from market research
chooses to acquire information only through competitive intelligence, when both firms have
moderate value amplification factor from market research.
2.6 The Impact of Competitive Intelligence
As a classic information acquisition tool, market research and its role of directly
reducing uncertainties in new product market have been well studied by both researchers
and practitioners. Yet, much less attention has been focused on the role of competitive
intelligence in a competitive R&D market, especially its interaction with market research
and R&D investment decisions. To tease out the impact of competitive intelligence, we
first study a benchmark scenario where competitive intelligence is not possible, and then
compare the equilibrium results of this benchmark with the results of our original model
with competitive intelligence studied above.
The benchmark case is very similar to the original model except both firms cannot
do competitive intelligence. That is, in the benchmark case, both firms can only choose
to conduct up-front market research to resolve market uncertainty, before choosing their
R&D investment decisions in the new product market. They cannot conduct competitive
intelligence. As a result, they cannot observe their competitor’s investment decisions or
infer their competitor’s private information about the market size through CI. The follow-
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ing proposition characterizes the equilibrium information acquisition strategies, investment
strategies, and expected payoffs for the two firms in the benchmark model. (Let 0 and 0
denote firm ’s investment level and excepted payoffs respectively in the benchmark model.)
Lemma 2.1 When competitive intelligence is not possible, both firms will conduct market
















In absence of competitive intelligence, firms cannot directly observe each other’s
investment decisions or infer private information about the market size. Hence, the tensions
that hold back the firms from doing market research in our original model — namely, the
potential strategic information management burden and potential benefits from the com-
petitor’s signaling distortion — do not exist in the benchmark case. As a result, both firms
find it optimal to always conduct market research. This outcome echoes the conclusion in
existing literature that market research is valuable in new product markets, helping firms
to make better investment decisions. Also since firms cannot monitor their competitors’ in-
vestment decisions through competitive intelligence, investing early or late has no impact on
their information endowments and firms always choose their investment levels based only
on their expectations about the competitor’s R&D decision as if they “simultaneously”
make their R&D decisions. The equilibrium investment levels and payoffs depend on their
capabilities of amplifying the market value through market research.
We now compare the outcome in benchmark case to the results of our original
model with CI in Proposition 2.3, to see how the presence of CI impacts firms’ information
acquisition and investment strategies. An immediate observation is that the availability of
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competitive intelligence reduces firms’ incentives for market research, as summarized in the
proposition below.
Proposition 2.4 The availability of competitive intelligence blunts firms’ incentives for
market research: (i) It is possible that a firm chooses to acquire information only through
competitive intelligence, although market research is free and guarantees perfect information
and the benefit of value amplification factors while competitive intelligence relies on the com-
petitor acquiring and revealing information through investment decisions; (ii) Furthermore,
a firm may choose to forgo both market research and competitive intelligence, and remain
uninformed when making R&D investment decisions.
In the benchmark case, both firms will always conduct market research to acquire
information. However, with the presence of competitive intelligence, (  ) emerges
in the equilibrium only in Region D in Figure 2.2 when the value amplification factors
for both firms are large enough. In Regions B and C in Figure 2.2, one firm chooses
to acquire information through competitive intelligence rather than market research, even
though market research is free and guarantees perfect information about market size and
the benefit of value amplification, while competitive intelligence relies on the competitor
acquiring and revealing information. In Region A in Figure 2.2, both firms actually choose
not to conduct market research and remain uninformed instead because of the information
management burden introduced by the possibility of CI by the competitors.
Competitive intelligence also impacts firms’ R&D investment decisions. With the
possibility of CI, the two firms always invest sequentially, and the firm investing late can
fully observe the pioneering competitor’s investment decisions through competitive intelli-
51
gence before choosing its own R&D investment level. When firms adopt symmetric market
research strategies (in Regions A and D in Figure 2.2), the strong firm conducts compet-
itive intelligence to observe the weak competitor’s investment decisions and then utilize
this information in choosing its own R&D investment level. When firms adopt asymmetric
market research strategies (in Regions B and C in Figure 2.2), the presence competitive
intelligence actually leads to an endogenously formed signaling game where the informed
firm needs to strategically the market information signals in his investment decisions. The
following proposition concludes the impact of competitive intelligence on firms’ payoffs in a
competitive R&D market.
Proposition 2.5 () A firm may benefit from his competitor’s competitive intelligence:
although the firm investing early is vulnerable to its competitor’s competitive intelligence,
it may get a higher expected payoff than that in the benchmark case without competitive
intelligence. (ii) Competitive intelligence can benefit the industry as a whole: the total
expected payoff of the two firms can be higher than that in the benchmark case without
competitive intelligence.
Although competitive intelligence does reduce firms’ incentive to do market re-
search, it can actually increase the total payoff for the firms and benefit the industry as a
whole. This is because, by helping firms monitoring their competitor’s investment decisions,
competitive intelligence essentially establishes a credible information channel between the
competing firms, or more precisely, an information flow from the pioneering firm who in-
vests early to the lagging firm who invest late. This allows the pioneering firm to actively
or passively show his R&D investment commitment, or helps the lagging firm to better co-
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ordinate its R&D investment decision. Because the pioneering firm invests early, it cannot
observe and utilize the competitor’s investment decisions in tailing its own R&D investment
level. In addition, its own investment decision and possibly his private superior informa-
tion about the market size are vulnerable to the competitor’s competitive intelligence. But
the firm may still benefit from the competitor’s competitive intelligence and get a higher
payoff than that in the benchmark case. This is also because of the credible information
flow established by competitive intelligence. The pioneering firm can strategically influence
the lagging competitor’s investment decisions by its own commitment in R&D investment
through this communication channel enabled by competitive intelligence. However, his ben-
efit from competitive intelligence will be smaller than that of the lagging firm who can utilize
the information collected by competitive intelligence in choosing his investment level.
In our market share attraction model, the two firms are better off if they can share
the new product market without over-competing with each other. Competitive intelligence
indeed eases competition intensity by lowering the total R&D investments in the competitive
R&D market. When firms choose the same market research strategies (in region A and D in
Figure 2.2), the weak firm  strongly prefers to avoid head-to-head competition and lower
its R&D investment. With the strong firm ’s competitive intelligence, the weak firm can
invests early and credibly commit to a low R&D investment, and the strong firm can invest
late and also lower its own R&D investment after verifying the weak firm’s investment level.
The similar logic applies when firms choose asymmetric market research strategies (in region
B and C in Figure 2.2), where the informed firm has incentive to under-invest to signal the
private information about the market size. In either case, competitive intelligence enables
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the two firms to communicate and coordinate their investment decisions, and lower the
competition intensity in the new product market. In fact, except for a small part of Region
I, the benefit of information communication through competitive intelligence dominates the
loss from reduced incentive in conducting market research, and the industry gets a higher
total expected payoff when competitive intelligence is available.
2.7 Conclusion
Compared to the well studied Market Research, Competitive Intelligence is a rel-
atively recent phenomenon. Our research is amongst the first to spotlight competitive
intelligence, and shows how (and why) competitive intelligence emerges as an alternate
channel to obtaining information. In specific, our key finding that competitive intelligence
emerges even when firms have the option to costlessly conceal their information supports
praxis in providing a novel explanation, centered around the need to strategically manage
information, for the recent emphasis towards competitive intelligence. In addition, from a
more theoretical perspective, our results shed light on the impact of CI on sequential inno-
vation and industrial welfare. In fact, the endogenous evolution of CI in our model lends
credence to several theoretical papers that assume that decisions and moves of the rival are
observed by default.
Although we have kept our assumptions to a minimum, and the decisions in our
setup evolve endogenously without being encumbered by an imposed sequence of moves — an
exogenously specified sequence of moves is, in fact, ubiquitous in most such game theoretic
models — our model remains stylized and rests on several assumptions, such as only two
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possible sizes of the market, perfect information through market research, etc. However, we
can relax most of these assumptions without altering insights.
Our model of two horizontally competing firms is set within an R&D context.
However, the scope and importance of competitive intelligence can be much broader and
deeper than that — it can easily be extended to vertical firms or both horizontal and vertical
firms; and not necessarily within R&D contexts. In fact, the presence of CI, which is now
a billion dollar industry, will likely tweak the way firms make and execute decisions in the
near future. All of this presents a fascinating avenue for future research.
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Chapter 3
Trembling into Myopia: Honesty in
the Dynamic Hold-up Problem
3.1 Introduction
In the classical hold-up problem (cf. Klein et al., 1978; Milgrom and Roberts,
1992), a firm’s relationship-specific commitments — i.e., commitments which are most useful
in a specific relationship — leave it vulnerable to ex post opportunistic behavior by its
contracting partner (whether its supplier or its customer). An illustrative example of the
hold-up problem, as detailed in Milgrom and Roberts (1992), is in the location of coal-fired
electricity-generating plants. For efficiency reasons, plants prefer locating near the source
of energy (coal). However, building the plant near the coal-mine is a relationship-specific
investment — once the plant is built near the coal-mine, it is locked into purchasing coal
from the mine for the very reasons collocating is efficient in the first place. Hence, the plant
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is susceptible to being held up by the coal-mine. For instance, once a plant is collocated
with the coal-mine, the mine can gouge the plant’s profits by increasing (renegotiating)
the price of coal. Locating the plant near customers (an alternative efficient arrangement)
may not solve the hold-up problem either. For such plants, coal must be hauled from the
mines to the plant — doing so by railroad is often the most cost-efficient. Once the rail-lines
are setup between the plant and the mine, the plant can potentially hold-up the railroad
company — for instance by paying lower than agreed tariff to the railroad — since these rail-
lines are typically useless outside of hauling coal from the mine to the plant (the rail-line is
a relationship-specific investment).
Two conditions are necessary for hold-ups to emerge (cf. Milgrom and Roberts,
1992). The first is relationship-specific commitments. As Pennings et al. (1984, page 308)
note: “The more specialized [relationship specific] a firm’s commitments, the more it entraps
itself...fostering opportunistic behavior among the customers [contracting partners].” The
second condition for hold-ups to emerge is non-contractible outcomes (arising out of contract
incompleteness), which allow wiggle room for opportunistic ex post renegotiations. Figure
3.1 details the typical timeline for the hold-up problem (cf. MacLeod, 2002). The key
features are: () The relationship-specific investment or effort (Stage 2); () Noncontractible
outcomes (Stage 3); and () The possibility of renegotiation or hold-up (Stage 4).
The canonical example of General Motors (GM) Vs. Fisher Body illustrates how
relationship-specific commitments and non-contractible outcomes can interweave to drive
hold-ups. The following account of GM-Fisher Body dealings is based on Klein et al., 1978;
and Klein, 2007.
In the year 1919, car-design began shifting to closed metal bodies from open wooden
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Figure 3.1: A typical timeline for the hold-up problem (cf. MacLeod 2002)
ones. In an effort to guarantee an adequate supply of closed-metal-bodies, GM asked
its key supplier, Fisher Body, to make significant GM-specific commitments in dies
and stamping machines. Fisher Body balked for fear of being held up by GM once
these GM-specific commitments were made. To alleviate these fears, GM signed a 10
year exclusive cost-plus contract with Fisher Body, which stipulated that Fisher Body
would be the exclusive supplier for all the closed-metal-bodies required by GM. To
prevent a reverse hold-up, i.e., to prevent Fisher Body from exploiting the exclusiv-
ity to overcharge GM, a complex set of constraints was placed on the price. It was
hoped that the exclusive contract with its built-in checks-and-balances would prevent
either firm from holding up the other. This worked for a few years. Around 1924,
two events colluded to significantly increase GM’s demand for closed-metal-bodies: ()
there was a sudden surge in demand for GM products, especially the Chevrolets; and
() the industry adopted closed-metal-bodies in a big way. (According to GM’s annual
report of December 1924, more than 65% of the cars produced in the previous year
had closed-metal-bodies.) This spike in demand was not anticipated by either GM or
Fisher Body, and hence commensurate actions were not discussed in the original 1919
contract (i.e., the contract was incomplete despite its sophistication). General Motors
therefore sought to renegotiate the original contract; in specific, it wanted Fisher Body
to collocate its manufacturing plants with GM’s assembly plants to economize on the
costs of transporting closed-metal-bodies from Fisher Body’s plants to GM’s assembly
plants. Fisher Body, however, once again balked for fear of being held-up. (Collocating
the plants would have been another relationship-specific investment.) Because GM was
locked into an exclusive contract with Fisher Body, it could not seek alternate source of
supply, thereby incurring extremely high transportation costs. The impasse was finally
resolved in 1926 when GM vertically integrated with Fisher Body. [Based on Klein et
al., 1978; Klein, 2007]
In the GM-Fisher Body example above, there were two instances of relationship-
specific commitments: The first were the GM-specific dies and stamping machines procured
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by Fisher Body. The second was the commitment made by GM to exclusively purchase from
Fisher Body (at essentially a cost-plus price) for a period of 10 years, which Fisher Body
ultimately leveraged to hold up GM by refusing to collocate plants. There were also two
instances of non-contracted outcomes: () There was an unanticipated spike both in the
overall demand for cars and in the demand for closed-metal bodies; and () Consequently,
the need for collocation was not anticipated, and was hence not covered in the original
1919 contract. Thus, both relationship-specific commitments and incomplete contracts
interweave to create the possibility of hold-up, leading to difficulties in vertical relationships,
as in the case of GM and Fisher Body.
In fact, the field of operations management is replete with examples of incomplete
contracts and relationship-specific commitments which together can lead to hold ups. For
instance, firms in short clockspeed industries, such as electronics, face an inexorable pressure
to launch new products quickly. To accelerate product launch, suppliers are contracted to
build product-specific production capacity while the product is still being developed (so
that the product can be manufactured as soon as development is finished). Consequently,
such capacity contracts are typically incomplete since neither the procurement price nor
the product specifications can be finalized when the contracts are signed, Sako (1992).
Hence, with both relationship-specific commitments (in the form of product-specific capacity
investments) and incomplete contracts in play, the potential for hold ups is writ large, cf.
Taylor and Plambeck (2007), Sako (1992). Similar challenges are also faced by automotive
manufacturers in getting their suppliers to build capacity for the rapidly evolving hybrid
vehicles, Hoyt and Plambeck (2006).
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In general, hold-ups (or even the fear of hold ups) stifle relationship-specific com-
mitments, leading to inefficient outcomes. For instance, in the GM-Fisher Body example
above, GM was forced to incur unnecessarily high transportation costs due to Fisher Body’s
refusal to collocate plants (as noted above, Fisher Body effectively held up GM by lever-
aging the exclusive cost-plus supply contract); Sako (1992) documents how Toshiba’s UK
suppliers typically balk at investing in relationship-specific capacity, for fear of being held
up, unless price and design specifications are fixed (see discussion above).
The classical remedies proposed in the economics literature to mitigate the hold-up
problem are often complex (e.g., sophisticated contracts which focus on minimizing incentive
conflicts between firms even though contracts are incomplete; see, for instance, Bolton and
Dewatripont 2005, chapter 12), and extreme (such as vertical integration); cf. Milgrom
and Roberts (1992). (Incidentally, both these remedies were witnessed in G.M. Vs. Fisher
Body.)
However, vertical integration is not widespread and, indeed, many bilateral re-
lationships thrive with simpler vertical contracts instead of the more sophisticated con-
tracts proposed in the literature, despite the wide prevalence of incomplete contracts and
relationship-specific commitments which together can lead to hold ups. (Several eminent
economists, notably Coase (1988, 2006) and Tirole (1999), have flagged this troubling incon-
sistency between theory and practice.) For instance, several Japanese suppliers of Toshiba
— in contrast to the U.K. suppliers who, as noted earlier, are reluctant to invest in rela-
tionship specific capacity unless price and design specifications are fixed — willingly invest
in capacity before prices and designs are finalized, and they are compensated by Toshiba
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without hold ups, Sako (1992). In fact, in many instances, these suppliers initiate invest-
ments in capacity, or start production, merely based on requests placed by phone or fax
by the buyer. In another example, the practice of placing soft orders (orders that are not
binding, and hence are not court enforceable) is common in the semi-conductor industry.
Such soft orders reflect the best available forecast that the downstream manufacturer has
at that point in time, and are used by the upstream suppliers to plan and initiate their
capacity and production decisions. In fact, suppliers often invest in relationship-specific
capacity based on these soft orders before more formal court-enforceable binding orders are
placed, even though the threat of hold ups looms large, Taylor and Plambeck (2007), Cohen
et al. (2003), Johnson (2003). Finally, for every Fisher Body, there is also an A.O. Smith,
another supplier of closed metal bodies, with which GM had a harmonious relationship for
many years, Coase (1988).
Several questions arise that we attempt to address in this research. Given the
propensity to hold-ups, why is vertical integration not more widespread, and why do so
many bilateral relationships thrive (as also noted Coase, 2006)? Furthermore, why do so
many of these firms employ simple vertical contracts instead of the more sophisticated
contracts proposed in the literature? In essence, how is the threat of hold-up mitigated
in practice (as the evidence indicates it must be), without resorting to complex contracts
and vertical integration? A possible unifying explanation for all the above questions is that
firms do honor their contractual obligations, even when presented with opportunities to
hold-up (as the following example shows). Macaulay (1963) argues that: “. . . a key virtue
of relational contracting is that parties can count on each other to abide by the spirit of
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the contract. . . one doesn’t run to lawyers if he wants to stay in business because one must
behave decently.” The question that then arises is: Why and when would firms choose to be
irrationally honest (defined in this context as always honoring contractual terms and hence
never holding up their contracting partners)?
We answer this question through a stylized dynamic economic model of an evolv-
ing relationship between a manufacturer and its supplier wherein the manufacturer has the
opportunity to hold-up the supplier. Our model has three essential features: () A dy-
namic (multiperiod) setting to capture repeated interactions between a profit-maximizing
manufacturer and its supplier; () A manufacturer who is, with some probability, rational,
myopic or honest,1 although this particular trait cannot be discerned or signaled in ad-
vance2; and () A tendency for all types of manufacturer to tremble into myopic behavior
— manufacturers may play their optimal myopic (single-period) strategy, even when this
differs from their optimal dynamic strategy, for reasons ranging from bounded rationality
to intra-firm incentive conflicts. (Refer to Section 3.1.1 for an elaborate discussion on the
fundamentals of our modeling framework, including trembles into myopia.)
We prove that: () The the mere possibility of honest manufacturers can elicit hon-
est behavior from rational manufacturers, thereby mitigating the hold-up problem. (This
result is similar in flavor to the well-known result in the reputations literature where even
1These traits are defined more formally in Section 4.2. But, in short, the honest manufacturer never
holds up his contractual partner, the myopic manufacturer always holds up his contractual partner, and the
rational manufacturer may or may not hold up his contractual partner, whichever gives him a higher payoff.
2In Frank’s (1987) model, set in the context of evolutionary game theory, there exist exogenous character-
istics that (imperfectly) signal honesty before interactions occur. Furthermore, interactions with an honest
partner are exogenously rewarded with higher payoffs. Hence, both opportunistic and honest individuals
within populations seek honest partners to interact with, given the ex ante (imperfect) signal of honesty.
Given the propensity to interact with honest partners, Frank proves that in equilibrium populations must
include a certain proportion of honest individuals. In contrast, in our paper, there is no ex ante signal of
honesty nor is honesty rewarded exogenously with higher payoffs. Despite this, we prove that honesty can
emerge as the optimal policy.
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a small probability of commitment type who has one strategy, such as the honest type in
our model, can force the rational type to mimic the commitment type’s strategy for some
periods of play. The contribution of this paper is in fleshing out the details and structural
results within the context of the hold up problem in specific and incomplete contracts in
general.) () But more importantly, we go above and beyond the reputation literature in
proving that, under very reasonable conditions, the honest manufacturer obtains greater
profit than both the rational and the cheat manufacturer, even though the rational manu-
facturer’s strategy space includes mimicking the honest manufacturer (but not vice-versa).
And thus, the disconnect between practice and theory that was alluded to earlier can be
bridged with honesty since the hold-up problem is mitigated without resorting to complex
contracts or vertical integration.
3.1.1 Bounded Rationality: Transaction Cost Economics and ‘Trembles
into Myopia’
Bounded rationality is a sine qua non for studying real-life economics; as Ruben-
stein (1998, pg. 4) argues: “...substantive rationality is actually a constrained on themodeler
rather than an assumption about the real world...[however] without [rationality] we are left
with a strong sense of arbitrariness.” Thus, to incorporate bounded rationality in our model-
ing framework, and yet to avoid the pitfalls of moving too far away from rationality — hence
players in our model are intendedly rational but limitedly so, Simon (1964, p. xxiv) — our
model makes two very measured and well-founded departures from the tenets of rational-
ity: () Players are unable to write complete contracts enforceable in a court of law, which
places our model squarely within the framework of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) cf.
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Williamson 1985; and () Players can tremble into myopia.
Transaction cost economics. The contracting literature in neoclassical eco-
nomics, such as the mechanism design approach, is oriented towards removing (ex ante)
incentive misalignments between contracting parties thus enabling frictionless execution of
contracts ex post. Such an approach not only requires anticipating all contingencies that
may arise — thereby placing extraordinary demands on human faculties — but also assumes
that disputes are effectively and costlessly adjudicated by the courts. The world of Transac-
tion Cost Economics (TCE), cf. Williamson (1985), eases the gargantuan expectations on
both fronts: it explicitly allows for bounded rationality whereby firms are unable to foresee
“everything that might happen and unable to choose optimal actions at the blink of an eye”
(Kreps 1990, Pg. 745) — hence, rather than anticipate all bridge crossings in advance at the
time of signing the contract, only actual bridge crossings are addresses by the firms as the
events unfold — nor are courts able to effectively settle all disputes.3 Hence, in the world of
TCE, the ex post costs of consummating a contract become at least as important as the ex
ante costs of drafting the contract.
The friction in executing incomplete contracts is exacerbated by two elements: (i)
Relationship specific investments (or Asset specificity), described earlier4; and (ii) Oppor-
tunism (described below).
Williamson (1985) describes opportunism as ‘self-interest with guile’. An oppor-
3Macaulay argues that, in sharp contrast to neoclassical presumptions in both law and economics, con-
tractual disputes are more often than not settled privately by parties without resorting to the court of law. In
fact, Galanter (1981, Pg. 4) argues that “...in many instances the participants can devise more satisfactory
solutions to their disputes than can professionals constrained to apply general rules on the basis of limited
knowledge of the dispute.”
4More formally, a transaction is said to have high asset specificity if, as the transaction develops, one side
or the other or both become tied to and in the power of the other side, see Kreps 1990, Pg 747.
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tunistic individual seeks to maximize his gains and can lie, cheat and deceive with impunity
if it serves his purpose. Such opportunism is very much ingrained in the study of contracts
in neoclassical economics as well. For instance, adverse selection and moral hazard prob-
lems are two well-studied instances of ex ante and ex post opportunism respectively. In our
model, the rational manufacturer is an archetypal opportunistic player. In contrast, the
honest manufacturer is self-interested but without guile.5 He seeks to maximize his profits
within the confines of the signed contract (ex post strategic behavior is denied). Williamson
(1985) calls this the ‘world of promise’ where, despite asset-specificity and bounded rational-
ity, the execution of the contract with an honest manufacturer is efficient and self-enforcing.
Trembles into myopia. Most business relationships have an ‘ongoing’ dynamic
flavor — firms interact with each other repeatedly. Within the context of repeated interac-
tions, an optimal (dynamic) strategy optimizes expected profits of a firm over all interactions
— present and future. In contrast, a myopic strategy maximizes present gains while ignoring
future interactions. The myopic strategy can be dynamically optimal under certain condi-
tions (cf. Sobel, 1981; Anand, 2014), or it may be an optimal response to high uncertainty,
poor information or risk aversion — especially in the presence of deliberation costs (cf. Con-
lisk, 1996). But in most dynamic contexts such as ours, the myopic strategy is suboptimal;
however firms play it for various reasons ranging from bounded rationality (cf. Conlisk,
1996) to incentive conflicts within firms (cf. Anand and Mendelson, 1997). It is in this
spirit that firms in our model can tremble into myopia where, with a small probability, they
5It can be argued that since the honest manufacturer in our model acts in accordance with a specified
behavioral pattern — that of always honoring the contract — he is behaviorally rational. However, a behav-
iorally rational individual does not maximize a utility function (cf. Kreps 1990, pg. 747). In contrast, the
honest manufacturer in our model maximizes profits and hence is more consistent with Williamson (1985)’s
nomenclature of ‘self-interested without guile’.
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mistakenly play the myopic strategy.
A note on trembles. Beginning with the seminal paper by Selten (1975), trem-
bles — where players mistakenly play unintended strategies — have been regarded as inevitable
by game theorists. Trembles have mostly been used to refine the set of Nash equilibria and
are conventionally not viewed as a constraint on the rationality of players even though trem-
bles are mistakes in executing strategies. (Aumann (1997) ironically calls this particular
use of trembles as super-rationality where players are rational not only on the equilibrium
path but off the equilibrium path as well.) However, consistent with Aumann (1997, pg.
8), this paper takes the view that trembles are small departures from rationality where
players make mistakes in executing strategies in the presence of debilitating factors such
as deliberation costs. Moreover, much of economics has treated trembles as random and
arbitrary (cf. Aumann 1997, pg 9.) without isolating the source of trembles, or the precise
‘technology of errors’ (Kreps 1990). For instance, in Selten (1975)’s seminal paper, players
tremble with arbitrary probabilities to alternate strategies. Myerson (1978) allows for lower
trembling probabilities for more expensive mistakes, but without a precise mapping between
the cost of trembles and trembling probabilities. In contrast, trembles in our paper are not
arbitrary: players, as noted above, tremble only to their myopic strategy in the presence of
deliberations costs or incentive conflicts within firms.
3.2 The Model
A manufacturer and a supplier, indexed by m and s respectively, are engaged
































Figure 3.2: Sequence of events
supplier can make a relationship-specific investment  which generates a value of ̃ for
the manufacturer. In return, the manufacturer promises a fraction of the realized value as
compensation to the supplier. Both firms are risk-neutral, expected profit maximizers.
In specific, in each period  there are four stages, see Figure 3.2. (The sequence of
events in Figure 3.2 operationalizes Figure 3.1, which delineates the events in the classical
hold up problem. Indeed, our sequence of events and the accompanying assumptions are
consistent with classical papers on hold up, cf. MacLeod (2002).
In Stage 1, the manufacturer contracts with the supplier to share a fraction  of
the potential project value ̃, which is realized in Stage 3. The payment (or part thereof) to
the supplier must depend on the realized outcome ̃ otherwise the supplier has no incentive
to invest at all. In fact, our assumed contractual form is optimal for the manufacturer, refer
to Propositions 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3.
In Stage 2, the supplier decides his investment  ∈ {0 1} at a cost of  (),
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where  (1) =  and (0) = 0. Consistent with the literature on hold ups (cf. Klein et
al 1978), the supplier cannot sell the value derived from his investment to any other firm,
i.e., the supplier’s investment is relationship-specific and has no value outside the supplier’s
relationship with the manufacturer. Moreover, consistent with models of hold up and moral
hazard, the investment is non-contractible.
In Stage 3, the project value ̃ is realized. The project value ̃ is uncertain and
is jointly determined by the supplier’s investment level  and nature (e.g. uncontrollable
market forces). In specific, ̃ =  ( − ) +  with probability  and ̃ =  with
probability (1− ) with the following interpretation: A base value of  is guaranteed with
minimal level of effort (normalized to  = 0). With higher effort at  = 1 an incremental
value of ( − ) is generated with probability  (hence total realized project value is 
with probability ) whereas no such value is generated with probability (1− ), in which
case realized value remains at  Hence, the final value of the supplier’s investment is both
a function of the effort as well as idiosyncratic market forces represented by  Furthermore,
because  is guaranteed, it is contractible. However, the incremental value ( − ) is
non-contractible: Although the incremental value is observed by both parties in Stage 3,
this value cannot be verified and arbitrated in a court of law. (The assumption that a
portion of the realized value is unverifiable is ubiquitous in the literature on hold ups and
is, in fact, one key reason which renders contracts incomplete in the first place (refer to
Section 3.1.1) Additionally, the reader can consult Klein et al (1978), Klein (2000), Klein
and Leffler (1981), Baker et al (1994) for practical underpinnings of this assumption.)
(In effect, when  = 1 ̃ =  with probability  and ̃ =  with probability
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(1− ), and when  = 0 ̃ = ; where  is contractible whereas ( − ) is not.)
In Stage 4, if no hold up occurs, the manufacturer pays the supplier the contracted
share  of the realized value ̃. Hold up occurs if the manufacturer renegotiates a lower
   ̃ Consequently, the manufacturer pays 

 to the supplier which is lower than
the contractually committed share ̃ Renegotiation, if attempted, is successful since: ()
The supplier cannot sell the investment in the outside market because the investment is
relationship specific; and () The value ̃ is non-contractible; hence renegotiation cannot
be challenged in a court of law.
(In summary, the manufacturer moves twice in each period: first in Stage 1 when
he offers  and then again in Stage 4 when he pays the supplier, possibly with renegotiation.
The supplier moves once in Stage 2 when he decides his investment )
The manufacturer can be one of three types: he can be rational, honest or cheat.
The respective proportions of rational, honest and myopic firms are: ,  and .
A rational manufacturer is a dynamic (i.e., long-run) profit maximizer who can
willfully cheat (or hold up) his contacting partner, or can indeed selectively honor his
contractual commitments, whichever gives him a higher long-run payoff. Hence, the rational
type is the quintessential opportunistic player who is aptly characterized as ‘self-interested
with guile’ by Williamson (1985).
The honest type is also ‘self-interested’ but, unlike the rational type, he is ‘without
guile’ in the parlance of Williamson (1985). That is, the honest manufacturer too seeks
to maximize his long-run profit but he never holds up the supplier and always pays the
contractual share ̃ to the supplier in every period.
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The third cheat type is a myopic short-term profit maximizer who seeks to maxi-
mize only the current period’s profit. In order to do so, the cheat type always holds up the
supplier whenever such an opportunity presents itself. (That the optimal myopic strategy
is to always hold up the supplier is proved more formally in Proposition 3.1.) We model the
cheat type as a ‘control’ to both the honest and the rational types: He is a short-term profit
maximizer in contrast to the rational and honest types; in addition, he is the mirror image
of the honest type — whereas the honest type never holds up his contractual partner, the
cheat type always does so. Moreover, the myopic type presents a very natural (and useful)
benchmark given that the manufacturer in our model can tremble into myopia.
Finally, with a small probability, all types of manufacturer tremble into myopia.
That is, with probability close to 0, the manufacture (any type and in any period) can play
the myopic strategy (which maximizes his short-term payoff) even when it is dynamically
optimal to not do so. Reasons for firms to tremble into the suboptimal myopic strategy
range from bounded rationality to incentive conflicts within firms, as noted in Section 3.1.1.
Let  denote the probability the supplier ascribes to the manufacturer of being
type  at the beginning of Stage  in period ; where  =  denotes the rational type,
 =  denotes the honest type and  =  denotes the cheat type. (Hence,  denotes the
supplier’s beliefs on the manufacturer’s type.) For instance, the vector of beliefs at the start
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To minimize clutter, we normalize  = 0, and denote  =  . All parameters




are common knowledge. Also, for simplicity, no time discounting
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is considered.
3.3 Benchmarks: Dynamic Game with Complete Informa-
tion
Ours is a dynamic game of incomplete information where the informed manufac-
turer — informed about his type; honest, rational or cheat — and the uninformed supplier —
uninformed about the manufacturer’s type — interact over multiple stages across two peri-
ods. The supplier has initial beliefs — a probability assessment over the manufacturer’s type
— at the beginning of the game. These believes evolve as the game proceeds, and are forged
both by the actions of the manufacturer and the observed outcomes. The resulting analysis
involves a complex interplay of strategies and beliefs over two periods with multiples stages
within each period. To better understand the tensions that shape the strategies of the two
players, we first eliminate incomplete information (thereby negating the role of supplier’s
beliefs) by analyzing the following two dynamic games of complete information: (i) The
manufacturer is known to be honest, the honest-manufacturer-only case; and (ii) The man-
ufacturer is known to be either rational or cheat, the rational (or cheat)-manufacturer-only
case. With a better understanding of the strategies and the tensions at play, we thereafter
infuse the supplier’s beliefs back in the mix (in Section 3.4) by analyzing the dynamic game
of incomplete information.
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3.3.1 The Honest-manufacturer-only Case
Under the first benchmark, we consider a finitely repeated relationship between
the supplier and an honest manufacturer, i.e.,  = 1. Since the honest manufacturer
always pays the supplier the contracted share, there is no threat of hold up. However, the
supplier still faces the risk of the investment failing in the market — in each period , with
probability (1 − ) the realized value e is zero resulting in zero payment to the supplier
(̃ = 0 whenever ̃ = 0). To induce the supplier to invest, the manufacturer, through
his choice of  in Stage 1, must compensate the supplier for the cost of his investment as
well as for the exogenous risk of the project failing. The following lemma establishes the
unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this benchmark case.
Lemma 3.1 If the supplier knows that the manufacturer is honest, the unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium of any finitely repeated relationship is:
(i)  ≥ ( ). In each period, the manufacturer offers ∗ =  in Stage 1. In
Stage 2, the supplier invests, i.e., ∗ = 1, iff  ≥ ∗. In Stage 4, the manufacturer always
honors the contract, and pays the supplier ∗̃. The expected payoffs for the supplier and
the manufacturer in each period are  = 0;  =  − .
(ii)   ( ). The manufacturer does not offer a contract in Stage 1 of any
period. Consequently, there is no investment by the supplier in Stage 2 and both players get
zero profit in any period.
Consider the last period in the relationship. In Stage 1, the honest manufacturer
offers a share ∗ = ( ) that is just large enough to induce the supplier to make the
relationship-specific investment leaving the supplier zero payoff in expectation — anything
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higher directly eats into the honest manufacturer’s profit since he gets the remaining (1−)
share of the realized project value (part () of the above Lemma). When the project is not
lucrative in expectation (i.e., when the cost exceeds the expected value,    ), even an
 = 1 cannot induce the supplier to invest. In this case, the manufacturer simply gives up
and does not offer any contract in equilibrium; consequently, there is no investment by the
supplier.
Since the last period has a unique equilibrium, which is equivalent to the equilib-
rium of a one-shot (single-period) game, the unique equilibrium of any period in a finitely
repeated relationship is identical to the equilibrium of the terminal period (Gibbons 1992,
pg. 84), as detailed in the Lemma above.
3.3.2 The Rational (or cheat)-manufacturer-only Case
Suppose the supplier knows that the manufacturer is rational, i.e.,  = 1. In
this case, the remuneration of the supplier is subject to not only the exogenous risk of
the project failing as before, but also the risk of being held up — even if the project is
successful, the rational manufacturer can take advantage of the relationship specificity of
the investment and renegotiate a    ̃. Hence, in this case, the contracted  in Stage
1 must compensate for the exogenous risk of the project failing and also for the risk of hold
up.
As the following lemma proves, a rational manufacturer always renegotiates in the
absence of the honest type; hence, the distinction between the rational and cheat types is
rendered moot in this particular context. The lemma below, which establishes the unique
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of this benchmark game, is thus crafted more generally
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and applies to any probability distribution over types that places zero probability on the
presence of honest types.
Lemma 3.2 If the supplier knows that the manufacturer is not honest, i.e. if the supplier
believes that the manufacturer is either rational or cheat, then the unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium of any finitely repeated relationship is as follows: In Stage 4 of any period , the
manufacturer renegotiates   = 0 when the realized value is  , and honors the contract if
the realized value is 0. Consequently, in Stage 2 of the period, the supplier does not invest,
i.e., ∗ = 0 ∀.
Consider, again, the last period of the repeated relationship. When the project
fails and ̃ = 0, the manufacturer’s decision in Stage 4 is trivial because the payment to
the supplier is anyway zero and hence renegotiation (equivalently, hold up) is pointless.6
However, when the realized value ̃ =  , renegotiation is profitable, and in the absence
of future interactions, it is a dominant strategy for the rational manufacturer to hold up
the supplier and gobble the entire  in Stage 4 through renegotiating a   = 0. (The
cheat type, by definition, always renegotiates whenever ̃ =  .) In fact, as the following
Corollary establishes, the rational type always holds up the supplier in the terminal period
of any finitely repeated game, with or without complete information.
Corollary 3.1 The rational manufacturer always renegotiates in the terminal period when
̃ =  .
Thus, in the last period, the supplier gets hit with zero payment irrespective of the
6The zero payment to the supplier is an outcome of normalizing  to zero. In effect, the supplier gets
paid a minimal amount of  which can be thought of as the contractible portion of the outcome, cf.
Bolten and Scharfstein (1990), Plambeck and Taylor (2006).
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project value: If the project fails, the payment is anyway zero and if the project succeeds,
the manufacture gobbles up the entire value through renegotiation. Thus, anticipating zero
payment in Stage 4 irrespective of whether the project succeeds or not, the supplier does not
make any investment in Stage 2 of the last period not withstanding how high the contracted
 is.
Through backward induction, it is easy to see that the same result emerges in
every period of the finitely repeated relationship — the rational (or cheat) manufacturer
always makes zero payment to the supplier in Stage 4 (whether through renegotiation or
because the project fails) and the supplier thus has no incentive to invest in Stage 2. In
other words, if the supplier knows for sure that the manufacturer is not honest, no contract
or investment is possible in a finitely repeated relationship.
The outcome of no effort, although stark because low effort is normalized to zero,
replicates the well-known result where rational firms scale back their relationship specific
commitments because of the potential for hold ups, cf. Hart (1995)  The outcome also
mirrors the arguments proposed in the Social Contract Theory of ethics (cf. Rachels and
Rachels, 2010) where, in the absence of honesty with the accompanying fear of being at the
receiving end of opportunistic behavior, contracts break down and hence economic exchange
is rendered impossible. Clearly, as emphasized earlier, this is contrary to empirical evidence
in the real world. But, as we show below, with the introduction of the honest type, more
plausible outcomes commensurate with observations in the real world emerge.
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3.4 Dynamic Game with Incomplete Information
As we saw in the benchmark games with complete information, the supplier faces
two risks: () the risk of the project failing — with probability (1− ) the project is unsuc-
cessful due to idiosyncratic market forces; and () the risk of hold up in Stage 4 — with
probability
¡
1− ¢ the manufacturer is either a cheat or is rational, and both these types
hold up the supplier in the benchmarks. The first risk is fixed and is exogenous to the model
itself. However, in the benchmarks, the second risk was exogenously fixed as well because
we imposed  as either 0 or 1.
Consider now the game of incomplete information where the supplier is unsure
of the manufacturer’s type at the beginning of the two period relationship, i.e., suppose
that 0    1 Immediately, the risk of being held up in Stage 4 is not polarized to any
one extreme as in the benchmark games of complete information. But more importantly,
the risk is not exogenously fixed either and it evolves as the game unfolds in line with the
evolution of the supplier’s beliefs, which in turn are forged by the manufacturer through his
strategies For instance, if the manufacturer holds up the supplier in Stage 4 of period 1,
the supplier must update his beliefs to 21 = 0, i.e., he must believe that the manufacturer
cannot be honest (since the honest type never renegotiates).
More generally, the supplier has the following information when deciding his in-
vestment: He observes  in Stage 1 of the current period  and, in addition, if period 2
is in play, he knows the outcomes of the previous period — specifically the realized value
and whether the manufacturer renegotiated Based on the manufacturer’s actions and the
observed outcomes the supplier updates his beliefs in a Bayesian fashion.
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Hence, when deciding his strategy, the manufacturer must consider not just the
(static) tensions inherent in the benchmark games of complete information (such as com-
pensating the supplier, through the contracted  for the risks that the supplier faces),
but also the impact of his strategies in shaping the evolving beliefs of the supplier. For
instance, holding up the supplier may now be suboptimal for the rational type in period 1
of the relationship because, as noted above, the supplier then believes with probability 1
that the manufacturer is not honest reverberating with zero future payoff for the manufac-
turer per Lemma 3.2. Hence, the long-term (dynamic) payoff of the players are a function
of both the strategies and beliefs; consequently, the manufacturer can, and should, forge
these beliefs — the probability ascribed to him by the supplier of being of a certain type —
through his choice of strategies.7 Hence strategies of the manufacturer, to the extent that
they impact the beliefs that the supplier holds, must be dynamically optimal in that they
must optimize not just the payoff in the current period, but the joint payoff of current and
all future periods.
The central thesis of the analysis then is the joint determination of both strategies
and beliefs and their impact on the equilibria and the payoffs in a dynamic (multi-period-
multi-stage) context.8 The appropriate equilibrium concept is thus the Perfect Bayesian
7Such formulation of beliefs and their role in forging equilibrium outcomes — including payoffs to the
players — is critical and is given much importance in standard signaling games where the informed player
moves just once (cf. Anand and Goyal, 2009). In our setting, with signaling opportunities spread across
multiple stages over two periods, the supplier’s beliefs are especially critical because beliefs, through the
supplier’s investment as noted above, determine the manufacturer’s payoff in both the current and future
periods.
8Given the temporal nature of the supplier’s beliefs, with the manufacturer enjoying multiple opportu-
nities to shape these, beliefs can in fact be interpreted as the manufacturer’s reputation, cf. Kreps et al,
(1982). The manufacturer can enhance his reputation — which, like beliefs, is the probability ascribed to
him by the supplier of being of a certain type — by a certain kind of play. For instance, the manufacturer
can enhance his reputation for being honest, which translates to the supplier ascribing him a (weakly) lower
probability of being rational, by ‘acting’ as if he were the honest type, such as by offering the same share
 to the supplier as the honest type does in Stage 1 and then by not holding up the supplier in Stage
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Nash equilibrium (PBNE) which requires an explicit specification of both strategies and
beliefs, both on and off the equilibrium path.
We first consider how the strategies and beliefs interact together in a (static) single
period. The analysis of the single period also serves to establish the equilibrium of the last
period of any finitely repeated game.
3.4.1 The Single Period (Equivalently, The Last Period) Equilibrium
In a single period with incomplete information (equivalently, the last period of
the two-period game with incomplete information), the supplier is unsure of the type of
manufacturer that he is facing; unlike in the benchmark games of complete information







be the supplier’s beliefs at the start of the period 2.
In a single period, because there are no future interactions, the dominant strategy
for the rational manufacturer is to hold up the supplier (refer to Corollary 3.1). Hence, the
supplier faces both the risk of being held up by the rational and cheat types as well as the
risk of the project not succeeding. However, unlike in the benchmark case with no honest
types, the likely presence of honest types with probability 21 mitigates some of the risk




. Consequently, to induce the
supplier to invest, the manufacturer must propose an 2 which is at least large enough to
cover the above two risks for the supplier as well as the supplier’s cost of investment.
4. On the other extreme, if the manufacturer holds up the supplier, his reputation can be permanently
sullied — the supplier is then convinced that the manufacturer is rational — resonating with minimal payoff in
future periods. Reputation effects are thus folded within our analysis through the supplier’s beliefs; in fact,
some known results in the reputations literature emerge as a special case of our analysis when the trembling
probability  = 0
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In addition, there is one more facet of 2 that arises because even the single period
game is a dynamic game of incomplete information with an embedded signaling game. In
Stage 1, the manufacturer proposes 2 before the supplier makes his investment. Thus,
based on the announced 2 the supplier can revise his beliefs on the manufacturer’s type.
This presents an opportunity for the honest manufacturer to possibly signal his type through
2 and thus separate from the rational and cheat types.
Proposition 3.1 below establishes the PBNE of a single period (equivalently, the
last period of a multiperiod relationship) in terms of () the equilibrium 2 offered by each
type of manufacturer in Stage 1; () the equilibrium investment 2 by the supplier in Stage
2; () the equilibrium payment to the supplier in Stage 4; and () the beliefs of the
supplier after Stage 1.
Proposition 3.1 The PBNE for a single period (equivalently, the last period) when the






21) is as follows:
Case I: ≥ 
21
In Stage 1, all types of manufacturer offer ∗2(   21) =

21
. In Stage 2,
the supplier makes relationship-specific investment ∗2 = 1 iff 2 = 
∗
2, consistent with his
























) if 2 6= ∗2
(3.1)
In Stage 4, the honest manufacturer always honors the contract (that is, he never
holds up the supplier). The rational manufacturer and the cheat manufacturer honor the




The expected payoffs for the supplier, the rational manufacturer, the honest man-
ufacturer and the cheat manufacturer respectively are ∗2 = 0; 
∗
2 =  ; 
∗
2 =  − 21 ;
∗2 =  ;
Case II:   
21
.
The manufacturer does not offer any contract. Consequently, there is no invest-
ment by the supplier and all players get zero profit.
In Stage 4, the honest type pays the contractual share 2̃2 to the supplier with
no renegotiation. The cheat renegotiates whenever ̃2 =  The rational type too finds it
optimal to renegotiate since there are no future interactions with the supplier. Anytime the
manufacturer renegotiates (whether the cheat or the rational type), it is optimal to grab
the entire surplus, i.e., the renegotiated   = 0
To induce the supplier to invest, at a minimum the contractual 2 offered in Stage
1 must compensate the supplier for his cost of investment and for the risks of not getting
paid (either because the project fails or because the manufacturer is not honest). But
because 2 also serves as a signaling device — based on the contracted 2, the supplier
updates his belief on the manufacturer’s type — the choice of 2 by the manufacturer can
be more involved than simply maximizing the manufacturer’s profit subject to meeting the
participation constraint of the supplier; the manufacturer must also consider the beliefs that
the choice of 2 induces after Stage 1.
To elaborate, from the honest manufacturer’s perspective, an ∗2 which induces the
supplier’s investment and yet leaves the supplier with exactly zero surplus in expectation is




induce the supplier to invest because they renegotiate zero payment to the supplier in Stage
4 anyway. However, any 2 different from the one that the honest type finds optimal to
contract with backfires since it convinces the supplier that the manufacturer is not honest
(i.e. the manufacturer is either rational or a cheat), leading to zero investment by the
supplier per Lemma 3.2. Hence both the rational and the cheat types promise the same
2 that the honest type contracts with, thereby pooling with the honest type in Stage
1. Because ∗2 is optimal for the honest manufacturer, all types contract with 2 = 
∗
2.
Equation 3.1 captures the corresponding belief structure for the supplier.
The share ∗2: () compensates the supplier (in expectation) for his cost of invest-
ment as well as the two risks that the supplier faces; () maximizes the profit of the honest
manufacturer subject to the constraint in () above; and () serves as a signaling device in
Stage 1 since any 2 6= ∗2 convinces the supplier that the manufacturer is not honest. Be-
cause the equilibrium ∗2 is completely determined by the honest manufacturer, the honest
type, despite the simplicity of his payment strategy in Stage 4, is indeed a strategic player
who seeks to maximize his profits through optimizing 2.
The optimal ∗2 increases if the cost  increases, the project potential  decreases,





supplier requires a larger share of the project value to offset his investment cost and the
risks of either the project not succeeding or of getting held up. In specific, if, at the start
of the last period, the supplier is convinced that the manufacturer is honest, the required
contractual share coincides with that of Lemma 3.1, i.e., ∗2|21=1 = 
∗
, which is just enough
to cover (in expectation) the investment cost and only the exogenous market uncertainty.
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The supplier invests under the conditions of Part I of the proposition when the
share ∗2 is large enough to compensate the supplier for his cost of investment and the risks
of not getting paid in Stage 4. Hence, in contrast to Lemma 3.2, the presence of the honest
manufacturer — even with a probability strictly less than one — makes the economic contract
possible even in a single-period relationship.
When 21 is extremely low, or if the project is not lucrative enough (i.e., if the
cost of investment  is too high compared to its potential value  , or the success rate  is
low), the honest manufacturer needs to pay the supplier from his own pocket (2  1) to
induce investment. In this case, there is no investment in equilibrium by the supplier (part
II of proposition 3.1).
3.4.2 The First Period Equilibrium
In the first period, by definition, the honest type always honors the contract,
and the cheat type always renegotiates with  1 = 0 whenever ̃1 =  . However, the
single period (or myopic) strategy of holding up the supplier can backfire for the rational
manufacturer in period 1 since this convinces the supplier that the manufacturer is not
honest resonating with zero payoff the next period. Hence, in contrast to a single-period
game (or the last period of a multiperiod relationship) where the rational manufacturer
could renegotiate with impunity, the presence of a future period softens the incentives for
the rational manufacturer to renegotiate in Stage 4 of the first period. Specifically, two
factors hone the rational manufacturer’s incentives to hold up the supplier in Stage 4 of
period 1. First, the lure of future payoffs: When  is high, there is a high probability
that the investment in the forthcoming period 2 is successful (̃2 =  with high enough
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probability); by not renegotiating in Stage 4 of period 1, i.e., by pooling with the honest
type and paying the contracted 1 to the supplier, the rational manufacturer can hide his
type and gobble the entire ̃2 in period 2 (per proposition 3.1). The second factor is the size
of the payment (1) to the supplier in the current period: When 1 is small, the rational
manufacturer has stronger incentives to share a relatively small fraction of the realized value
with the supplier and keep the game rolling onto the next period.
In effect, by giving 1 to the supplier in period 1, the rational manufacturer
stands to gain  in period 2; by renegotiating and keeping the entire  in period 1 itself,
the rational manufacturer reveals his type and gets zero payoff in period 2. Hence, if 1
is (weakly) more than , the cost of being honest by sharing the large share 1 with the
supplier is too high compared to the value of future spoils; hence the rational manufacturer
prefers to renegotiate in period 1. Conversely, if 1 is less than  he prefers waiting for
future spoils by not holding up the supplier in period 1.
For exactly the same reasons advanced earlier in the context of period 2, the choice
of 1 is controlled by the honest manufacturer (as in period 2, all types of manufacturer
offer the same contract in Stage 1 of period 1 as the honest type). Hence, as before, the
honest manufacturer cannot separate in Stage 1. But he can trigger a separation from the
rational type in Stage 4 through his choice of 1, which can precipitate the incentives of
the rational manufacturer to renegotiate in Stage 4 In specific, the honest manufacturer
can either: () Induce the rational type to hold up the supplier in Stage 4 by offering an
1 ≥  and hence he can separate from the rational type (the separating strategy); or ()
Induce the rational type to play honest in Stage 4 through 1   thereby pooling with the
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honest type (the pooling strategy). Hence, in the first period, in addition to tailoring 1 to
accomplish the three objectives detailed earlier, the honest manufacture can strategically
use 1 to signal honesty in Stage 4 of period 1 — which is the fourth facet of 
As the following proposition establishes, the above tension for the honest type
is resolved in one of two ways depending critically on the project success rate  and the
probability the supplier ascribes to the manufacturer being a cheat .
Proposition 3.2 The PBNE of the first period of the two period game is as follows:
Case I: 2  
 (1−)
In Stage 1 the manufacturer (any type) offers ∗1 =

(1−)  . In Stage 2
the supplier makes relationship-specific investment (∗1 = 1) iff 1 = 
∗
1 consistent with
















) if 1 6= ∗1
(3.2)
Finally, in Stage 3, both the honest and the rational manufacturer honor the con-
tract regardless of the realized value. The cheat manufacturer honors the contract iff ̃1 = 0,
and holds up the supplier iff ̃1 =  with the renegotiated 

1 = 0.
The supplier’s updated belief (after Stage 4 of period 1, or equivalently, at the start






















 0) if ̃1 =  and the manufacturer does not renegotiate
(0 0 1) if ̃1 =  and the manufacturer renegotiates
(3.3)
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In the second period, the outcome is the same as stated in proposition 3.1 with 21
given by equation (33).
The total expected payoffs across the two periods are:
Π = 0;Π = 2 − 
1−  ;Π
 = 2 − 
1−  −
(1− )
1−  −  ;Π
 = 2 − 2
II) If 2 ≤ 
(1−)




(1−−)  . In Stage
2 the supplier makes relationship-specific investment (∗1 = 1) iff 1 = 
∗
1 consistent with
















) if 1 6= ∗1
(3.4)
In Stage 4, the honest type manufacturer honors the contract. Both the rational
type manufacturer and the cheat type manufacturer honor the contract iff ̃1 = 0, and
renegotiate  1 = 0 iff ̃1 = 











12) if ̃1 = 0











) if ̃1 =  and the manufacturer renegotiates
(3.5)
In the second period, the outcome is the same as stated in proposition 1 with 21
given by equation (3.5).
The total expected payoffs across the two periods are:
Π = 0;Π = 2 − 2 ;Π = 2 − 2− (
 + )
1−  −  ;Π
 = 2 − 2
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Consider Part I of the proposition. When  is high, the 1 ( ) required to induce
the rational type to renegotiate (and thus separate) is too high which eats into the payoff
of the honest type. Hence, the honest type announces an ∗1   and, consequently, the
rational types honors the contract in Stage 4 (Recall that the rational type finds it lucrative
to renegotiate only when 1  .) And because the rational type’s incentives to renegotiate
are completely controlled by the honest type through 1 the supplier is convinced upon
seeing an 1   that he will not be held up by the rational type in period 1. Thus, with
the risk of being held up alleviated (now only the cheat type renegotiates), the honest type
can contract with a lower ∗1 =

(1−) in equilibrium (compared with the 
∗
2 of the single
period), but still leave the supplier with zero payoff.
Under the equilibrium of part I of the proposition, the supplier is convinced that
the manufacturer is the cheat type upon observing renegotiation in Stage 4. However, when
̃1 =  and the manufacturer does not renegotiate, although the supplier is convinced that
the manufacturer is not a cheat, he cannot parse this information further to determine if
the manufacturer is indeed honest or just pretending to be one. But on a positive note,
because the supplier can always rule out the cheat type upon being paid honestly when
̃1 =  , he ascribes a higher probability to the manufacturer being honest in period 2
(i.e., 21 ≥ ), and hence the supplier invests again in period 2 for a smaller 2 (as per
proposition 3.1). When ̃1 = 0 because all types of manufacturer honor the contract, no
new information on the manufacturer’s type can be learned, i.e., 21 = 12 Equation (3.3)
captures the supplier’s updated belief after period 1.
When  decreases or  increases (i.e., if the supplier believes that the expected
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project value is lower or that the manufacturer is a cheat with a higher likelihood), the
supplier demands a higher share 1 to compensate for the higher risks of the project not
succeeding or of being held up by the cheat manufacturer; hence, the ∗1 of part 1
increases and, at some point, tips on the higher side of  thereby making it lucrative for
the rational type to renegotiate in period 1 itself. (Refer to the discussion before the
proposition.) That is, when ∗1 =

(1−) ≥  (which translates to 2 ≤ (1−) 
case II of proposition 3.2), the pooling equilibrium breaks down; instead, the separating
equilibrium is played where, given the high ∗1 relative to  the rational type renegotiates
and grabs the entire ̃1 in Stage 4 of period 1. Consequently, since now even the rational
manufacturer holds up the supplier, the honest type needs to offer an even higher share




 (1−−)  
∗
1  The
supplier updates his belief according to equation (3.5): Upon being held up, the supplier
is convinced that the manufacturer is not honest and 21 = 0; if, on the other hand, the
realized value is  and the supplier is not held up, in light of both the rational type’s and
the cheat type’s strategy of holding up the supplier, the supplier is convinced he is dealing
with the honest type and 21 = 1 As before, when ̃1 = 0 all types of manufacturer honor
the contract and hence no new type information can be learned, i.e., 21 = 12
The following corollary summarizes propositions 3.1 and 3.2 in terms of the strate-
gies of the rational manufacturer in Stage 4 (the strategies of the other two types are more
tightly bound by their types and are the same across the two periods) — in effect, the
corollary below delineates the optimal dynamic strategy of the manufacturer:
Corollary 3.2 () When  is high (part I of Proposition 3.2), the optimal dynamic strategy
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for the manufacturer in Stage 4 is to play Honest in period 1 and Renegotiate in period 2.
() When  is relatively small (part II of Proposition 3.2), the optimal dynamic
strategy for the manufacturer in Stage 4 is to Renegotiate in both periods 1 and 2. (That
is, the myopic strategy is optimal.)
Unlike long-term relationships with no honest types (Lemma 3.2), or the single
period relationship with some probability of honest types (Proposition 3.1) — in both in-
stances, the threat of hold up looms large — the presence of honest types in a long-term
relationship can mitigate the hold up problem in two ways: () Under part I of the Corollary
3.2, the rational type turns honest which reduces the threat of hold up in period 1; and
() Under part II of Corollary 3.2, the honest type weeds out the rational type through a
carefully chosen ∗1 — because the rational type opts to renegotiate in period 1, no hold up
in period 1 convinces the supplier that the manufacturer is honest leading to zero threat of
hold up in period 2.
Corollary 3.3 Long-term repeated relationship with even a small probability of the presence
of honest types can alleviate the hold-up problem.9
Despite the fact that honesty mitigates the hold up problem, the honest type
has lower payoff than the rational type manufacturer (Π  Π, see proposition 3.2) —
by definition, the rational type manufacturer has a larger strategy space and can freely
mimic the honest type if necessary. Indeed, in any dynamic relationship with  periods,
9Our results are thus consistent with the overall result in the reputations literature (cf. Kreps et al, 1982)
where even a small probability of the existence of a ‘commitment type’ who has only one strategy (such
as the honest manufacturer in our example who always honors the contract) can force the rational type to
mimic the commitment type. However, our model and anlaysis is specialized to the hold up problem which
has not been specifically addressed by the reputations literature.
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the rational type, even when he finds it optimal to honor the contract in the first  − 1
periods (thus mimicking the honest type and earning the same profit as the honest type
for the − 1 periods), boosts his payoff over and above the honest type’s by grabbing the
entire surplus in the last period. (And if the rational type cheats earlier, it is because it is
optimal to do so, and hence he still makes higher payoff than the rational type.) So then
the question that was posed in the introduction remains pertinent: Why do we see honest
types when economic Darwinism should have weeded them out?10
As we prove in the next section, trembles and myopia can collude together to
provide the enabling conditions for the honest type’s payoff to exceed the rational (and
cheat) type’s, thereby providing an economic rationale for honesty.
3.5 Dynamic Game with Trembles
The honest and the cheat manufacturer have just one strategy — the honest manu-
facturer never holds up the supplier whereas the cheat type always does so — consequently,
the cheat and the honest types face no strategic tension in Stage 4 of any period. In con-
trast, the rational manufacturer has two elements in his strategy space — he can either hold
up the supplier or play honest. In period 2, however, the rational type never plays hon-
est — the only strategy that he ever implements in period 2 is to renegotiate independent
of parameter values (Proposition 3.1). Hence, similar to the cheat and honest types, the
10If the question is posed more generally, such as why we see commitment types — after all, the honest type
is an example of a commitment type who has just one strategy — the question of their existence is equally
tantalizing for the reputation literature, which has simply assumed the presence of commitment types. In
fact, due to a lack of a compelling reason for their presence, commitment types are often deemed ‘irrational’
since they do not maximize utility, cf. Aumann (1997, pg.9); but this interpretation is rather unappealing
in economic models of reputation which are otherwise steeped in rationality.
89
rational type faces minimal cognitive burden in period 2. But the rational type needs to
be much more calculative in period 1. Based on parameter values, his optimal dynamic
strategy differs: he can either play honest (part I of proposition 3.2) or he can renegotiate
(part II of proposition 3.2). Hence, because the rational type faces a cognitive burden of
choosing strategies in period 1, he is susceptible to slipping up ever so slightly and playing
a suboptimal strategy as a consequence in stage 4 of period 1. (Such mistakes are identified
as trembles in the literature, cf. Aumann 1997.) In specific, under part I of proposition
3.2, the optimal dynamic strategy of playing honest is at odds with the myopic strategy of
renegotiating. Because myopia is a very natural and reasonable alternative (for the reasons
detailed in Section 3.1.1 such as deliberation costs, cognitive limitations and incentive con-
flicts within firms), the rational type can tremble into myopia where he mistakenly plays
his myopic strategy even when it is dynamically suboptimal to do so.11
Within the context of our model, all types of the manufacturer can play the myopic
strategy with probability. However, in light of the above discussion, trembles clearly have
no impact on the honest and the cheat types simply because there is no alternate strategy
to tremble to. Trembles have no impact on the rational type either in period 2 or in period
1 when  is small (part () of Proposition 3.2) — in both these cases, the myopic strategy
11The procurement paradigm at General Motors in the 90s presents a fascinating example of incentive
conflicts within firms which can lead to a suboptimal choice of the myopic strategy. In the 1990s, General
Motors (GM) routinely leaked its suppliers’ design innovations to their competitors in order to trim sourcing
costs. Leakage, though arguably lucrative in the short run for GM, blunted the suppliers’ incentives to
innovate, thus hurting GM in the long run. To restore its sullied reputation, GM mandated a company-
wide no leakage policy which would, once again, provide incentives for the suppliers to innovate. (Hence,
no-leakage can be thought of as the optimal dynamic strategy in contrast to the myopic strategy of leaking
which reaped only short-term rewards.) However, despite its best efforts, GM was unable to completely
curb leakage — one key reason was that employees, driven by short-term (myopic) performance objectives,
continued leaking design innovation to other suppliers ignoring the long-term consequences of their actions.
(In effect, GM was prone to ‘trembling into myopia’.) GM finally surrendered and asked its suppliers to
patent their innovations to legally preclude leakage. (Based on Murphy 2007).
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of renegotiating is anyway optimal (essentially, the rational type trembles into the same
strategy that he is implementing). Additionally, trembles are also ruled out when ̃1 = 0
because there is no value to renegotiate over. In essence, trembles impact the rational type
only in period 1, and only when ̃1 =  and the rational types intends to play honest.
Finally, both the supplier and the manufacturer (all types) are aware that there
is the potential to tremble to the myopic strategy with probability  and they optimally
incorporate this possibility in their strategies and beliefs.
The following proposition establishes the PBNE of the two period game when the
manufacturer can tremble, in terms of the strategies of the players, the beliefs of the supplier
and the profits of the player for all parameter values.
Proposition 3.3 The equilibrium for the first period of the two-period game with trembles
is as follows:
Case I: 2  
(1−−)
In the contract stage the manufacturer (any type) offers ∗1 =

(1−−) 
. In the effort stage the supplier makes relationship-specific investment (∗1 = 1) iff
1 = 
∗
1 consistent with his belief 

















) if 1 6= ∗1
(3.6)
Finally, in the payment stage, if ̃1 = 0, all types of manufacturer honor the
contract; if ̃1 =  , the honest type honors the contract, the cheat type holds up the supplier
with  ∗1 = 0, while the rational manufacturer honors the contract with probability (1−)
and renegotiates with  ∗1 = 0 with probability .
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The supplier’s updated belief (after Stage 4 of period 1, or equivalently, at the start





























) if ̃1 =  and the manufacturer renegotiates
(3.7)
In the second period, the outcome is the same as stated in proposition 3.1 with 21
given by equation (37).
The total expected payoffs across the two periods are:
Π = 0;Π = (2−)− (1−)
1−− ;Π





Case II: 2 ≤ 
(1−−)





. In the effort stage the supplier makes relationship-specific investment (∗1 = 1) iff
 = 
∗
















) if 1 6= ∗1
(3.8)
In the payment stage, if ̃1 = 0, all types of manufacturer honor the contract;
if ̃1 = the honest type manufacturer honors the contract, while both the rational type















12 ) if ̃1 = 0











) if ̃1 =  and the manufacturer renegotiates
(3.9)
In the second period, the outcome is the same as stated in proposition 1 with 21
given by equation (3.9).
The total expected payoffs across the two periods are:
Π = 0;Π = 2 − 2 ;Π = 2 − 2− (
 + )
1−  −  ;Π
 = 2 − 2
When ̃1 =  the tension facing the rational type in period 1 is the same as
in Proposition 3.2: when 1 ≥  the manufacturer prefers grabbing the entire value now
through renegotiating  1 = 0; and for 1  , the lure of the future payoff in period 2
keeps the rational manufacturer honest in period 1. With one caveat — when 1   with
probability  the rational manufacturer trembles and plays the myopic strategy (which is
to renegotiate and hold up the supplier) even though the dynamically optimal strategy is
to honor the contract. For this reason, the actions of the rational manufacturer are not
completely controlled by the honest type through 1 — there is no guarantee that even with
1   the supplier will not be held up by the rational type. Thus, the honest manufacturer
has to augment the contractual share in Stage 1 to ∗1 =

 (1−−) ≥ ∗1
of proposition 3.2 to compensate the supplier for the additional risk of the rational type
trembling and holding up the supplier
As before, not only does ∗1 increases as  decreases or 
 increases, but
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now ∗1 also increases in  and 
. That is, anticipating higher chance of being
accidentally held up by the rational manufacturer, either when the manufacturer is more
likely to be rational for a given  or when the rational manufacturer mistakenly chooses
the suboptimal myopic strategy more often (higher  for a given ), the supplier asks for
a higher contractual share (i.e., a larger 1) to compensate his risk of being held up. When
eventually ∗1  , the rational manufacturer renegotiates and holds up the supplier
in period 1 itself if ̃1 =  ; the honest manufacturer thereby needs to further increase the




 (1−−) = 
∗
1 ≥ ∗1 , in order to compensate the
supplier for the risk of always being held up by the rational type. Notice that when the
rational manufacturer chooses to always hold up the supplier even in period 1, the myopic
payment strategy is also dynamically optimal, so the equilibrium strategies and outcomes in
part II of the proposition 3.3 are identical to those without trembles in part II of proposition
3.2. Also, when  = 0 the equilibrium of Proposition 3.2 emerges; hence, our proposed
equilibria are robust to trembles in the classical sense.
The following Lemma establishes the impact of trembles on the manufacturer’s
payoff.
Lemma 3.3 The trembling probability  impacts the manufacturer’s expected payoff across
two periods as follows.
() When  
1−−(2 )

=  (equivalently, part I of proposition 3.3),















)  , and decreases in  otherwise.
() When  ≥ 1−−(2 )

(equivalently, part II of proposition 3.3), all types of
manufacturer’s payoffs are independent of .
Consider first part () of the the Lemma, which coincides with part I of proposition
3.3. The rational manufacturer’s profit decreases in  for two reasons: First, trembles
prevent him from implementing his dynamically optimal strategy of playing honest in period
1. Second, ∗1 increases in  — so even when the rational manufacturer executes his
optimal strategy of honoring the contract in period 1, he has to pay the supplier a higher
share of the realized value, leaving himself lower profit in period 1. The cheat type’s strategy
of always renegotiating whenever ̃ =  renders it tremble-proof and also independent of
the share  offered to the supplier; hence his payoff is independent of .
Although the honest manufacturer too has a simple tremble-proof strategy, but
unlike the cheat type, his payoff is impacted by trembles in two ways. First, as noted
before, when  increases, the contractual share ∗1 increases which lowers the honest
manufacturer’s payoff in period 1. But there is a second more subtle reason which favors
the honest type as  increases: because the rational manufacturer can tremble into renego-
tiation, upon seeing honest behavior in period 1, the supplier ascribes a higher probability
to the manufacturer being honest (as per equation 3.7, 21 increases in ) which results
in a lower contractual share that the honest manufacturer needs to pay the supplier in
period 2 — i.e., 2 decreases as  increases through enhanced reputational capital enjoyed
by the manufacturer in period 2. Hence, a higher trembling probability : () increases




which increases the honest manufacturer’s payoff in period 2. For  small, the latter effect
dominates so the honest manufacturer’s total payoff is increasing in ; when  is large, the
increased cost in period 1 overweighs the savings in period 2 and the honest manufacturer
earns a lower total expected payoff as  increases.
Under part () of the Lemma, when  ≥ , which coincides with part II of
proposition 3.3, the rational manufacturer chooses to renegotiate in period 1; hence trembles
have no effect on any type of manufacturer.
A comparison of the total profits of the three types of manufacturer is shown in
figure 3.3 as a function of the prior probability of the honest type (horizontal axis) and the
probability of trembles (on the vertical axis).
Region 1 corresponds to part II of proposition 3.3 where the optimal dynamic
strategy of the manufacturer is to renegotiate in period 1 itself. Consequently, the strategy
of the rational and cheat types coincides earning them identical profit, which is more than
the profit of the honest type (clearly the optimal dynamic strategy in this region is to hold
up the supplier in period 1 itself, which is at odds with the honest type’s strategy).
Regions II, III and IV in figure 3.3 correspond to part I of proposition 3.3. Even
though the payoff of the rational type is susceptible to trembles in these three regions
(unlike the cheat type), the rational type makes higher profit than the cheat type in these
regions because the rational type attempts to implement the optimal dynamic strategy of
playing honest in period 1 — he succeeds with probability (1−) — whereas the cheat type
is constrained to be suboptimally myopic.
Corollary 3.4 Despite possessing a tremble-proof strategy, the cheat type never obtains a
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Figure 3.3: Profits of the three types of manufacturer as a function of  and .
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higher payoff than the rational type for any    or 
When the probability of honest types is small enough, such as in Region II of
Figure 3.3, the burden of contracting is rather onerous for the honest type — because of
the high probability of cheat and rational types, the supplier demands a greater share of
the value as compensation for the risk of hold up thereby hurting the profitability of the
honest type. However, as the probability of the honest type increases, the supplier’s share
decreases in equilibrium, thus increasing the profit of the honest type. So much so that the
honest type can accrue a higher payoff than the cheat type in Regions III and IV despite
both having tremble-proof strategies.
Now consider the relative profits of the honest and the rational types in regions
 and  which are characterized by a high enough probability of the presence of honest
type In both these regions, the rational manufacturer attempts to pool with the honest
manufacturer by honoring the contract in Stage 4 of period 1. For a given  as increases,
i.e., as one travels from Region III in the figure upwards to Region IV, the payoff of the
rational manufacturer decreases per part () of Lemma 3.3, whereas the honest type’s payoff
first increases then decreases, refer to the discussion below Lemma 3.3. However, there exists
a critical threshold on  call it ∗ beyond which, i.e., in Region IV the honest type’s
payoffs are higher than the rational type’s payoff.
Theorem 3.1 In a two-period dynamic relationship with trembles, the honest type out-
performs both the rational type and the cheat type iff ∗(   )    , where





1− −  +
1− − 
(1−  − )
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(The condition ∗(   )     guarantees that the probability of
trembles ought to be high enough, but not so high that the rational type finds it optimal
to renegotiate in period 1 itself.)
The simple tremble-proof strategy of the honest type trumps the richer strategy
of the rational type. In essence, the curse of dimensionality, i.e., the richness of the ra-
tional type’s strategy space, works against him in the presence of cognitive limitations and
managerial myopia (which together can lead to trembles into myopia). However, it must be
emphasized that merely possessing a simple tremble-proof strategy is no guarantee for sur-
passing the rational type’s payoffs; after all, even the cheat type has a simple tremble-proof
strategy but is never able to make a higher profit than the rational type for any parameter
value.
3.6 Conclusion
Our results show that, in a single period, the rational manufacturer outperforms
the honest type — after all, the rational type can always mimic the honest-type’s strat-
egy. However, even in a minimal repeated relationship (i.e., over just two periods), the
honest-type manufacturer may outperform the rational type, even though, as before, the
rational type can always mimic the honest-type’s strategy. This happens when the project
is lucrative enough (low cost to value ratio, or large enough probability of realizing a ‘high’
investment value), or interactions are repeated several times. The following implications are
imminent: () Honesty is rewarded in a repeated innovation partnership — it emerges endoge-
nously as the optimal policy under very reasonable conditions. () The hold-up threat is
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mitigated in two ways without resorting to complex and extreme measures suggested in the
economics literature: First, honest-type manufacturers are honest throughout (and honesty
emerges endogenously as noted above). Second, rational-type manufacturers play honest
(i.e., they do not hold-up the supplier) in the earlier periods of a repeated relationship. As
the hold-up problem is mitigated, all parties are better off in equilibrium.
Within the context of the hold up problem in operations, this paper proves that
an honest firm, which never hold up its contractual partner, can earn a higher payoff than
the quintessential rational firm, even when the rational firm has a larger strategy space
than the honest firm (i.e., the rational firm may or may not hold up its contractual partner
whereas the honest firm never holds up its contractual partner). In fact, one should say
that the honest firm makes higher payoff than the rational firm because it has a smaller
strategy space, which renders its strategy robust and immune to trembles. In effect, if one
discards the tenet of unbounded rationality, and realistically assumes that people often make
mistakes in implementing strategies, then the choice of honesty emerges both as desirable
and rational under very reasonable conditions. (However, merely having a tremble proof
strategy cannot guarantee a higher payoff than conventional rationality. For instance, the
cheat type, although possessing a tremble-proof strategy, never outperforms the rational
type.)
Honest behavior in some transactions can be explained by a rational response
to mimic honesty (as in the reputations literature) or it can be explained by the threat
of punishments for dishonest behavior (as in the literature on infinite-horizon relational
contracts). However, it must be emphasized that such explanations do not prove that
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honesty as a trait is the optimal policy; on the contrary, these explanations further buttress
the already strong paradigm of conventional rationality that leads to selective honesty as a
form of opportunism. In contrast, this paper makes honesty (as a trait) the centerpiece of
the analysis, and at the same time provides an economic rationale to its existence through
the operational lens of hold ups and incomplete contracts.
Finally, as Williamson (1985) posits (emphasis ours): “Any attempt to deal se-
riously with the study of economic organization must come to terms with the combined
ramifications of bounded rationality, opportunism and asset specificity [relationship-specific
commitments].” Our research makes a genuine attempt to integrate all three.
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Chapter 4
Honesty in Incomplete Contracts:
The Case of Moral Darwinism
4.1 Overview
In conventional reputation games (cf. Kreps et al. 1982), a rational player, whose
type is unknown to the other party, can selectively mimic a “committed” type in order
to maximize his own profits. Thus, the rational player, who is an unconstrained profit-
maximizer, always outperforms the type who is committed to (i.e., constrained by) a subset
of strategies.1 This result hinges on the tacit yet critical assumption that, barring one type’s
(irrational) commitment, players are otherwise perfectly rational. As we prove, this result
does not hold when both types are equally (even if so very mildly) bounded in their rational-
1The commitment type has been described variously as irrational— “in the sense that they do not maximize
utility”— or even “crazy” (Aumann, 1997, Mailath and Samuelson 2006).
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ity in other dimensions2: A type committed to honesty (defined below) can outperform the
unconstrained profit-maximizer even though the latter has access to a superset of strategies,
including the option of mimicking the honest type.
We develop a dynamic (multi-stage, multiperiod), analytical model of incomplete
contracts between a principal and an agent in a repeated relationship. The principal is
either an unconstrained or an honest profit-maximizer. The unconstrained principal, aptly
characterized as ‘opportunistic’ or ‘self-interested with guile’ by Williamson (1985), maxi-
mizes his own payoff subject only to legal restraints. The honest principal (‘self-interested
without guile’, Williamson, 1985) honors his contractual obligations even in the absence of
legal restraints. This distinction between unconstrained and honest profit-maximizers par-
ticularly matters under incomplete contracts where, due to inadequate legal recourse under
unforeseen contingencies, there can be a divergence between the letter and the spirit of the
contract. Although our modeling choices— a finite horizon, different ‘types’ of the principal,
incomplete and asymmetric information, and Bayesian players— are loosely similar to those
of a ‘reputations’ model (cf Mailath and Samuelson 2006), our model incorporates several
additional, demonstrably critical features such as honesty and a proclivity to tremble due to
bounded rationality. Our research makes several contributions, which we summarize below:
- Under plausible conditions, the ‘irrational’ (honest) type of principal strictly
outperforms the unconstrained type, even though the unconstrained principal can selec-
tively mimic the honest principal’s strategies. Thus, a commitment to honesty emerges
endogenously as the optimal policy.
2Bounded rationality manifests in our model as “trembles”, which are "small departures from rationality"
(Aumann, 1997).
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- In traditional reputation models, the unconstrained type outperforms the com-
mitment type by selectively mimicking the latter’s strategies. Without adequate contextual
justification, the presumption of commitment types who are not profit-maximizers, and
whose payoffs are strictly dominated, appears arbitrary and contradicts Economic Darwin-
ism. Reputation models work around this concern by showing that the equilibrium, which
typically has the unconstrained type faking commitment, is robust even when the prob-
ability of the commitment type’s existence is arbitrarily close to zero. Nevertheless, the
possibility of the specific (and, as discussed above, sub-optimal and arbitrary) irrational
type must influence players’ beliefs.3 This criticism is in the spirit of Rubinstein (1998),
that “... there are an infinite number of “plausible” models [incorporating irrationality]
that can explain social phenomenon; without [rationality], we are left with a strong sense of
arbitrariness.” The standard we propose for modeling irrationality to minimize arbitrari-
ness is that the constrained profit-maximizer (“commitment type”) should, at a minimum,
outperform the unconstrained type under plausible conditions, so that the specific type of
commitment assumed is not undermined by economic Darwinism.
- Conversely, given that some irrational traits (including ethical values such as
honesty) are commonly observed, despite incomplete contracts, our model postulates a set
of primitives (such as trembles) within the paradigm of economic modeling that explains
the survival of these traits. Hence, our research provides a bridge between normative ratio-
nales for honesty— the province of Ethics — and profit-maximization, which is axiomatic in
Economics, by providing a compelling economic rationale for honesty.
3More technically, a belief in the possibility of the specific irrational type assumed in the model must
interfere with the “common knowledge” of rationality, see Aumann (1992).
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- In sum, Rubinstein (1998) argues that “...substantive rationality is actually a
constraint on the modeler rather than an assumption about the real world...” Our proposed
standard relaxes this constraint on the modeler, in order to accommodate plausible models
of Bounded Rationality.
- Finally, in the context of incomplete contracts, we show that the principal can
induce the agent to make optimal relationship-specific investments, using simple, finite-
horizon contracts. Hence, we diverge from all previous explanations offered in the academic
literature (including relational contracts and conventional reputation models) for the ro-
bustness and widespread use of simple contracts.
4.2 The Model
A Principal and an Agent, both risk-neutral, expected-profit maximizers and in-
dexed by P and A respectively, engage in a contractual relationship spanning a finite horizon
of  ≥ 2 periods.4 In any period  ∈ {1  }, events evolve in four stages; see Figure 4.1.
(Our timeline with four stages is similar to the sequence of events assumed in the literature
on incomplete contracts, cf. Hart and Moore (1988 1999)  Tirole (1999).)
In stage 1, the principal offers a contract. If the agent accepts the contract, she
invests  in stage 2 that generates a non-transferable value ̃() for the principal in stage
3.5 Finally, the agent is paid in stage 4, possibly after renegotiation.
4Risk neutrality is a fairly standard assumption in the literature on incomplete contracts, cf. Hart and
Moore (1988 1999)  Tirole (1999). A risk-averse agent is easy to model, but would add clutter without
changing insights.
5“Non-transferability” of value rules out the possibility of the principal’s “selling the firm” to the agent.
For example, ̃() could be the value of one of several subprojects (such as R&D) contributing to the















Figure 4.1: Sequence of events in period  ∈ {1 2}.
The agent’s investment (equivalently, effort),  is unobservable and relationship-
specific; further the principal has residual property rights. The investment/effort can be
either ‘high’ ( = 1) or ‘low’ ( = 0). The cost of investment is  () where  (1) =   0
and (0) = 0. The value ̃() is observable to both parties, and has contractible and non-
contractible components (i.e., components that can and cannot be verified and arbitrated
by a court of law). Conservatively, we normalize the contractible component to 0 (As will
become clear later, relaxing this assumption strengthens our results.) Thus, ̃() is fully
non-contractible. Furthermore, ̃() is jointly determined by  and nature. In specific,
̃() =  with probability  and 0 otherwise, where   . Thus, ̃(1) =  with
probability  and 0 with probability (1− ) and ̃(0) = 0 identically.
The principal’s type, which is unconstrained or honest, and indexed by u and h
respectively, drives outcomes in stage 4. The unconstrained principal may renegotiate his
contractual payment to the supplier, whereas the honest principal never renegotiates. We let
 and (1− ) denote the probabilities that the agent assigns at the beginning of period  to
the principal being honest and unconstrained respectively; 1 ∈ (0 1) is common knowledge.
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As the relationship proceeds, the agent updates his beliefs  in Bayesian fashion. The
principal is susceptible to trembles— mistakes made in executing strategies— due to bounded
rationality (cf. Aumann, 1997). With a small probability  the principal trembles into
myopia; i.e., he inadvertently plays his optimal myopic (single-period) strategy instead of
his optimal dynamic strategy. This specific form of trembles is by no means critical to the
model, but is appealing in dynamic contexts, wherein a combinatorial explosion of feasible
actions— the curse of dimensionality (Bellman, 1957) — amplifies the effects of bounded
rationality and leads to myopia.6 In the interests of parsimony, we assume that only the
principal trembles, and the fact of his trembling is common knowledge. An additional
conservative assumption is that the principal has only one ‘trembling opportunity’ per
period (in stage 4). In practice, a period could consist of dozens of interactions, and thus
present several type-revealing trembling opportunities across multiple stages. Relaxing this
assumption would further favor our results.
It is readily seen that the optimal myopic strategy (equivalently, the last-period
strategy) for the unconstrained principal is to always renegotiate in stage 4, whereas the
honest principal does not have access to this strategy. Hence the honest principal never
renegotiates; as a result, his optimal stage 4 strategies in both static and dynamic settings
are identical. (Because the honest principal’s feasible strategies in stage 4 is a singleton set,
he is in fact tremble-proof under any model of trembles— trembling into myopia being but one
instance. In general, tremble-proofness can be an artifact of either unbounded rationality
6Myopic policies ignore the effects of current actions on future periods, and hence, are rarely optimal in
dynamic contexts. (See Anand (2014) for interesting exceptions.) Yet, managers choose myopic policies for
several reasons, including: an inability to navigate complex and multiple objectives (Conlisk 1996, Ethiraj
and Levinthal 2009), incentive conflicts (Stein 1989, Noe et al 2012, Thanassoulis 2013), takeover threats
(Stein, 1988), a looming equity offering (Mizik and Jacobson 2007) and a desire to signal their competence
in the labor market (Laverty, 1996).
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or a deliberate trimming of one’s feasible strategies. However, tremble-proofness is not a
sufficient condition to outperform the unconstrained type who trembles. The principal’s
commitment to honesty is critical in our context; see chapter 3.)
All parameters    and 1 are common knowledge. For simplicity, no time
discounting is considered, and we denote the total payoffs over the relationship horizon
for the agent, the unconstrained principal and the honest principal by ΠΠ and Π
respectively.
4.3 Results
Observe that the unconstrained principal has access to two alternative strategies
in stage 4 of any period: He can either renegotiate (thus revealing his type and ending
the relationship) or mimic the honest type and not renegotiate. Renegotiation in the first
period itself would cut short the dynamic aspect of the relationship, collapsing the game into
a trivial, single-period interaction. Hence, we focus on the more interesting case wherein
the unconstrained Principal wants the relationship to continue for at least two periods, and
hence mimics the honest type in stage 4 of the first period. Factors that favor the Principal’s
continuing the relationship beyond the first period are high values of: (a) the probability
of success  in the next period, (b) prior probability 1 of the principal being honest, and
(c) the potential payoff  from future iterations of the relationship. A sufficient technical






We now derive the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE) in pure strategies
for  ≥ 2. Sufficient conditions for any contract to maximize the principal’s payoffs are:
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(i) The agent exerts the first-best level of effort; and (ii) The agent’s individual rationality
constraint binds, i.e., she is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offered contract.
As we prove in Theorem 4.1, these conditions can be met by a sequence of period-length
contracts wherein the payment offered to the agent is  ̃ where 0 ≤  ≤ 1 and  the
principal’s type ∈ { }  (This implies, for example, that the principal cannot improve his
payoffs by offering a single, complex contract at the outset.)
Theorem 4.1 A pure-strategy PBNE for the dynamic (N-period) game, for  ≥ 2 is as
follows:
Period  ( ): The agent will accept a contract in period  (and hence, the game
proceeds to period ) if and only if there was no renegotiation in periods 1 through ( − 1)




(1−(1−)) ; the agent invests
in stage 2, setting ∗ = 1; and in stage 4, the optimal dynamic strategy for both types of
the principal is to not renegotiate, i.e., to pay ∗ ̃ to the agent. (Renegotiation occurs with
probability , when the unconstrained principal trembles into myopia.)
Updated Beliefs: At the beginning of period (+1), the agent’s posterior belief that
the principal is honest is:
+1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
 if ̃ = 0 (By default, the principal does not renegotiate)

+(1−)(1−)  if ̃ =  and the principal does not renegotiate
0 if ̃ =  and the principal renegotiates
(4.1)
Period  : The agent will accept a contract in period  (and hence, the game
proceeds to period ) if and only if there was no renegotiation in periods 1 through ( −1)





; the agent invests in
109
stage 2, setting ∗ = 1; and in stage 4, the unconstrained principal renegotiates (and pays
0 to the agent), whereas the honest principal pays ∗ ̃ to the agent.
Theorem 4.1 reflects the differences in principals’ strategies across the terminal
and non-terminal periods. In the terminal period  , the unconstrained principal always
renegotiates in equilibrium. In the non-terminal periods 1 through ( − 1), the strategies
of both types of the principal are to not renegotiate; yet, the risk of renegotiation is not
entirely eliminated because the unconstrained principal can tremble into myopia. The offers
of ∗ =

(1−(1−)) for  = 1  − 1 and ∗ =


reflect the respective probabilities
(1 − (1 − )) and  of no renegotiation, keeping the agent just indifferent between
accepting and rejecting the contract.
The next Theorem proves that for any repetitive relationship, the honest princi-
pal’s payoffs are strictly greater than those of the unconstrained principal under plausible
conditions.
Theorem 4.2 () ∀ ≥ 2 ∃∗ ∈ (0 1) such that Π  Π if   ∗ 
() ∗ is strictly decreasing in 
() lim−→∞∗ = 0
() ∀ ∗ is strictly decreasing in 1  and  , and strictly increasing in 
Part (i) of Theorem 4.2 shows that for any  including even for just one repetition
of the relationship ( = 2), the honest type’s payoffs can be strictly greater than the
unconstrained type’s. Part (ii) of the Theorem proves that ∗ is decreasing in  Thus,
as  increases, the honest type’s payoffs are greater than the unconstrained type’s for
progressively smaller trembling probabilities that asymptotically converge to 0 by part (iii)
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Figure 4.2: ∗ against  for different parameter values.
of the Theorem. Part (iv) formalizes the intuition that since trembles by the unconstrained
type abruptly terminate the game, parameter values that increase future expected payoffs
— high , 1 and  , and low  — favor the honest type.
Figures 4.2(a)-(c) illustrate Theorem 4.2 for varying values of  , , 1 and  .
As  , , 1 or  increase, 
∗
 falls; hence, the honest type outperforms the unconstrained
type at ever smaller . The effect of  is particularly dominant. As  grows, ∗ falls
rapidly for any combination of parameter values, and becomes very small beyond  ≈ 6.
The next Theorem fixes the trembling probability  and analyzes the effect of
varying the number of interactions 
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Figure 4.3: Profits difference between honest principal and unconstrained principal for
different parameter values.
Theorem 4.3 () ∀ ∈ (0 1)  ∃∗ such that Π  Π if   ∗
() ∗ is decreasing in  1  and  , and decreasing in 
Theorem 4.3 proves that for any arbitrary trembling probability  howsoever
small, the honest type will outperform the unconstrained type provided the relationship is
repeated long enough (for more than ∗ periods). Figures 3(a)-(d) show that Π − Π
increases with  and intersects the x-axis at or just to the right of ∗. In all cases, ∗ is
quite modest— ranging from 2 to 7 periods. In practice, a period itself could consist of many
potentially type-revealing interactions, whereas our model allows at most one tremble per
period. Thus, honesty can pay off in relationships spanning only a few periods.
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Consistent with part (ii) of Theorem 4.3, ∗ is decreasing in  1  and  , and
decreasing in  in the figures.
Recall that we had normalized the contractible (non-renegotiable) component to
0 and thus, ̃() was fully non-contractible. Relaxing this assumption, while easy to do,
would further punish the unconstrained type for his trembles and favor the honest type.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 also suggest that, when atomistic principals in a population
endogenously choose their types, ∗ is a tipping point for self-enforcement of honesty: For
any initial fraction of honest principals in the population, if   ∗ the result Π  Π
should nudge this fraction to 1; Conversely, if   ∗ the fraction of honest principals
should converge to 0. This raises interesting questions for future research about equilibrium
outcomes when societies vary in their cultural norms such as honesty.
4.4 Discussion of Modeling Assumptions
In order to keep the analysis tractable and to flesh out the insights in the cleanest
possible way, our model is parsimonious with several simplifying assumptions. (Although,
at a broad level, the context of hold ups is not particularly necessary for our results to hold;
our model and analysis apply equally well to the overall context of incomplete contracts.)
We discuss these assumptions below. We also discuss whether our key insights change as
we relax these assumptions.
1. Effort is binary. The agent makes an all-or-nothing investment decision in
stage 2 of each period. In practice, firms may not only choose whether to invest, but also
how much to invest. Hence, we also analyze a more complex model with continuous effort
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and convex costs. Our key results are robust to either model specification. For expositional
clarity, we present the simpler model in the paper.
2. Value is binary and independent across periods. For simplicity we assume that
() the project value is binary; () the project value and the corresponding probabilities
are stationary across periods; and () the investment in the current period has no impact
on the potential value in the next period. We can relax all of these assumptions without
changing results and insights.
For ()  the insights remain unaltered if the value ̃ is drawn from a continuous
distribution, or from a discrete distribution with more more than two possible values. As in
the current model, the unconstrained type will find it optimal to renegotiate to the minimal
value  in the terminal period. In the earlier period, the unconstrained type will find it
optimal to renegotiate if ̃ is more than some threshold (the renegotiated value will once
again be ) whereas for a value less than the threshold, he will not renegotiate. Hence,
the essence of the analysis and the insights remain unaltered.
For () and () it is even simpler to incorporate both extensions without changing
insights. In particular, for ()  the value ̃2 in period 2 can be modeled as a function of the
investment in period 1. For instance, ̃2 = ̃1(1 + 1); where   0 implies that the effort
in period 1 increases the potential value in period 2, whereas   0 implies the converse.
Our current model coincides with  = 0, which is both conservative and neutral
3. Model of trembles : Our model of trembles is parsimonious and has several
appealing features. First, because trembles are part of the equilibrium play, and because
players are aware of the possibility of trembles, players in our model blunt the impact of
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trembles, wherever possible, through appropriate strategies. For instance, the unconstrained
principal optimally plays honest less often to avoid trembling. In contrast, classical papers
have modeled trembles that are imposed by the modeler to refine equilibria without the
players in the game necessarily accounting for these when they decide their strategies.
Second, trembles prove to be type revealing in the specific context of our model, which is
critical to the insights developed in this paper. Hence, whether trembles are unidirectional
only into myopia, or they are arbitrarily determined, is of secondary importance. However,
trembles into myopia not only provide a much needed ‘technology of error’, they are also
conservative and minimalistic. For instance, they limits the mistakes players can make —
the unconstrained type could have trembled into playing honest when he intends to play
the myopic strategy of holding up the agent, but such trembles are precluded in our model.
(As an aside, such random trembles are difficult to justify, and even if modeled, they will
not change insights.) Moreover, allowing the players to tremble in only stage 4 of a period
is in a similar spirit of keeping the trembles at a minimum. Finally, as emphasized above,
the only kind of trembles necessary in our model are the ones that reveal type; any other
forms of trembles (or mistakes), such as miscalculating beliefs, etc., will only clutter analysis
without changing insights.
4 After renegotiation, the principal makes zero future payoff. It is logical in
our model that the principal makes zero future payoff once he renegotiates in a period
because the agent knows that the principal is not honest. There are two ways to relax this
assumption: () With some probability, the agent does not discern that he has been held
up in a period and therefore he continues his relationship with the principal for the next
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period; and () the principal gets some residual future payment after renegotiating. It is
easy to incorporate both these extensions, but fundamental insights remain unchanged.
Essentially, in our model, reputation is permanently sullied. But our findings are
not contingent on this. All we need is reputational loss. Quoating from Klein (1996): “...the
transactor engaged in hold up will face increased cost of doing business in future. Potential
trading partners will become less willing to rely upon the transactor’s promises and demand
more favorable and/or explicit contract terms...[for instance,] they can find more expensive
to purchase inputs in future.” (pg 11).
5 Finite horizon model. Although the number of periods in our model can
be arbitrarily large, the horizon is finite, i.e., there is a known time beyond which all
interactions cease. An infinitely repeated game is ill-suited for our setup for the following
reasons: () The analysis is unsatisfactory because multiple equilibria are possible due to
the folk theorem; and () It artificially tips the scale in favor of the honest type, and against
the unconstrained type, as the cost of cheating can be made arbitrarily large by using an
appropriately ‘grim’ trigger strategy.
Hence, the finite period model is the most conservative without biasing the model
in favor of our results since it favors the unconstrained type — the unconstrained type to
renegotiate with impunity in the last period — despite which we show that honest type can
accrue higher payoff than the unconstrained type.
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4.5 Conclusion
The simple tremble-proof strategy of the honest type trumps the richer strategy
of the unconstrained type. In essence, the curse of dimensionality, i.e., the richness of the
unconstrained type’s strategy space, works against him in the presence of cognitive limita-
tions and managerial myopia (which together can lead to trembles into myopia). (However,
merely having a tremble proof strategy cannot guarantee a higher payoff than conventional
rationality. For instance, the cheat type, although possessing a tremble-proof strategy, never
outperforms the rational type, see chapter 3.)
In fact, we have been so numbed by the idea of opportunism and rationality in
economic models that such desirable traits as honesty and trust are often characterized as
irrational and studied as deviations from the tenets of rationality. This paper offers an
explanation that not only suggests why traits such as honesty have not been weeded out
by economic Darwinism, but also offers a rational justification for honesty. The choice of
honesty emerges both as desirable and rational under very reasonable conditions. As the
Nobel laureate Williamson (1989, pg. 140) notes: “Those forms of organization that serve
to economize on bounded rationality [such as by selecting a simple strategy of honesty]
and safeguard transactions against the hazards of opportunism [again, a strategy of being
honest does that] will be favored....” Such favoritism ensures that traits such as honesty can
co-exist with the classical paradigm of the unconstrained rational man.
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Technical Appendix to Chapter 2












A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Consider the case when both firms choose to do market research (  ). Sup-
pose that market research reveals the true market size to be  ( can be  or , the
analyses of which are parallel). The two firms’ maximize their expected payoffs as follows:










Clearly, the firms’ optimal investment levels are functions of both the realized
market size  and the rival’s investment decision. In specific, ∗( |   ) =q







Depending on the firms’ choices of whether to conduct competitive intelligence,
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when to invest, and whether to conceal information on his investment, three possible game
configurations can occur:
() Firm  observes  before choosing his own , which happens when
firm  does competitive intelligence and invests late while firm  invests early and does















() Firm  observes  before choosing his own  , which happens when
firm  does competitive intelligence and invests late while firm  invests early and does













() In all situations other than the two above, neither firm  observes the



















It can be easily seen that when  =  , the three configurations essentially
have the same equilibrium outcomes — the two firms choose identical investment levels and
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generate identical payoffs, and they always share the market equally. Hence, there is no
unique equilibrium for the CI, investment timing and information concealment strategies.
When    , both firms make the highest payoffs under configuration ().
Hence, the unique equilibrium is that firm  does not do competitive intelligence and
invests early without concealing his investment, while firm  does competitive intelligence
and invests late. In the equilibrium, firm  invests more and captures higher market share


















case is very similar to the above, simply by replac-
ing  and  with 1, and  with  = +(1− ) . Hence, the equilibrium results
is identical to the case where  =  .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Since the two asymmetric market research strategies cases have parallel analysis,




case in detail. After the market research stage, the
two firms are asymmetric in two dimensions: firm  is perfectly informed about the realized
market size  or , and in addition he obtains the amplification factor  for the market
value; in contrast, firm  remains uninformed about the market size e and he does not
gain any amplification factor for the market value.
Again, depending on the firms’ choices of whether to conduct competitive intelli-
gence, when to invest, and whether to conceal information on the investment, three possible
game configurations can occur where one (or neither) firm may observe the rival’s invest-
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ment level and then optimize his own investment decision accordingly. The asymmetry
between firms’ information endowments introduces a new element to the game: upon ob-
serving the informed firm’s investment level  (such as when configuration () is in play),
the uninformed firm  may be able to infer the informed firm ’s private knowledge of the
statistical market size and may further utilize this newly inferred market size information
in choosing his own  . In other words, under some combinations of firms’ CI and invest-
ment strategies, a signaling game may be endogenously formed and CI may help convey
statistical market size information from the informed firm to the uninformed firm. We show
the equilibrium outcome details under each of these three configurations below.
() Firm  observes  before choosing his own investment level.
This forms a Stackelberg game with asymmetric information but no signaling: the
uninformed firm chooses his investment level based only on the prior knowledge about the
uncertain market size e, while the informed firm  can optimize his investment level with
































































































(Because configuration () is the most complex situation, we move its analysis to
the last.)
() Neither firm  observes the competitor’s  before choosing their
own investment levels.
In this case, there is also no change in the uninformed firm  ’s beliefs about the





































































































() Firm  observes  before choosing his own investment level
If the informed firm  chooses a separating strategy (i.e.,he chooses different in-
vestment levels for different market size states, or  6= ), then the uninformed firm
 can perfectly infer the realized market size from  before choosing his investment level.
While if the informed firm  chooses a pooling strategy (i.e.,he chooses the same investment
level for both market size states, or  =  =  ), then the uninformed firm  cannot
infer anything from  . Through the following lemmas, we first identify the existence condi-
tions for the separating equilibrium and the pooling equilibrium respectively, and then check
which equilibrium will be chosen by the players.
• The separating equilibrium.
Lemma A.1 There always exists a separating PBNE for  ≤ 2 in the game when the
uninformed firm  conducts competitive intelligence and invests late:












if  = 
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if Pr( = ) = 0
consistent with his belief that
Pr( = ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎩
1, if firm  invests early and  ≤ −
0, otherwise
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎭



















Proof. For a pure strategy separating equilibrium to exist, the ∗ and 
∗
 must










































 − ∗ (A.2)
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where




















The LHS of the IC constraints (equations A.1 and A.2) are the off-equilibrium profits that
each type of informed firm would get if he chooses to mimic the other, and the RHS are the
equilibrium profits when they truthfully reveal their types.
Constraint A.1 does not bind, as only the high type informed firm has incentive





































The LHS of equation A.4 is the profit of the high type informed firm  if he
pretends to be the low type and the uninformed firm  were to believe that the true state
is low. The RHS is the profit that the high type gets by choosing his optimal separating





 Hence, if LHS dominates the RHS (i.e., if constraint
A.4 does not hold), then the high type has incentive to mimic the low type. This happens


















( − )     +
p
( − ), the unconstrained optimal
investment level for the low type (
2
4








. This means, if the low type informed firm merely optimizes his payoff in
equation A.3, the high type informed firm will always mimic him, so natural separation
does not exist.
To successfully separate from the high type, the low type informed firm has to





 to the payoff function A.3, it is easy to see 
−
 yields the low type informed
firm higher payoff. Hence, the low type informed firm distorts his investment level and
under-invests with −, consistent with the uninformed firm’s belief that:
Pr( = ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
0, if firm  invests early and  ≤ −
1, otherwise
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
The last thing is to check whether the low type has incentive to unilaterally deviate
from the separating equilibrium. For instance, he can deviate and puts a quality e  −
such that the uninformed firm believes that he is a high-type according to the belief structure
in the lemma. Hence, for the low type, his payoff becomes































( − )  , we always have ∗− e. So the low-type informed
firm has no incentive to deviate.
Hence, there always exists a separating PBNE, and the details of the equilibrium
strategic, beliefs and outcomes are shown in lemma above.
• The pooling equilibrium.
Define the expected market size  =  + (1− )
Lemma A.2 For  ≥ 1 − 

There exists a Pareto-dominant pooling equilibrium in the
game when the uninformed firm  conducts competitive intelligence and invests late:





The uninformed firm  invests with ∗ =
(2−)
4
, consistent with his
beliefs that
Pr( = ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩












≤  ≤ ∗



















Proof. The pooling equilibrium is proved through a series of lemmas as follows.






Proof. We first establish the optimal preferred pooling investment levels, ∗
and ∗ , for the low and high type informed firm respectively. Suppose ∃ such that
upon observing this investment level, the uninformed firm is unable to infer the realized
market size and sticks to his priors. Hence, the uninformed firm  invests:







































We now show that any candidate investment level  for a pooling equilibrium





= ( )max, because the low type would
never agree to pool at a level higher than ∗ for any reasonable belief structure (where
the uninformed firm ascribes a (weakly) higher probability to the high market size upon
seeing a higher investment level by the informed firm). The proof is by contradiction.
Suppose ∃  ∗  Then the low type informed firm can deviates to invest ∗ and
does strictly better as long as the uninformed firm assigns a probability of at most 1−  to
 =  .






Proof. The high type informed firm  prefers pooling as long as his pooling profit
dominates his optimal separating profit. Hence, under any reasonable belief structure, there
should exist a investment level threshold such that any investment level lower than that
makes pooling unprofitable for the high type and induces him to separate out. Hence, a








































In other words, there is no pooling equilibria below ( )min = ( )min
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Lemma A.5 The pooling equilibrium exists for  ≥ 1− 


Proof. From Lemma A.3 and Lemma A.4, the pooling equilibrium exists if  ∈£
( )min ( )max
¤
 Hence, pooling exists whenever
( )min ≤ ( )max













( − ) ≤ 
⇒  ≥ 1− 






, which is the Pareto-dominant
pooling investment level





= ∗ . For






 ∗ . Therefore, the high type prefers pooling at a (feasible) investment
level closest to ∗ , which is 
∗















The profits expressions can be obtained fro the equilibrium investment levels after
some tedious algebra.
• The composite equilibrium.
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Lemma A.7 These exists a pure strategy PBNE, composite of Lemmas A.1 and A.2, which






and to the pooling equilibrium of Lemma A.2 otherwise.
Proof. Separation is the only pure strategy equilibrium (and hence unique) for
  1− 

.
For   1 − 

, we need to compare the separating and the pooling profits in
Lemmas A.1 and A.2. For the high type informed firm, it is readily shown in lemma A.4 that
he always prefers pooling at the the Pareto-dominant pooling investment level ∗ whenever
pooling equilibrium exists (i.e., for the entire region of   1− 

). While for the low-type









, and under separating otherwise.
We then show that the strategies of both types of the informed firm will reduce
to those under the separating equilibrium when  ≤ , and to the pooling equilibrium
otherwise. It is easy to see from the equilibrium lemmas that whenever pooling exists, the




 . This means, if the low type chooses to
separate at ∗, the high type will also choose his optimal separation strategy because he
never finds it profitable to mimic and pretend to be a low type at ∗, nor can a pooling
equilibrium be sustained at ∗. Since the low type informed firm earns higher profit under
separation when  ≤ , he can always successfully do so simply by investing ∗.
For   , both types prefer the pooling equilibrium to the separation equilibrium.
So they both will invest ∗ , and the pooling equilibrium of Lemma A.2 ensues.
The comparison of the three investment game configurations under
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asymmetric market research structure.
To see which one of the three game configurations will be endogenously formed by
the firms’ CI and investment decisions, we need to compare the firms’ equilibrium payoffs
in these three game configurations.





























Configuration II (Firm  observes )


































































First, because  ≥ 1, it is easy to see that for all players (i.e., the low type
informed firm, the high type informed firm, and the uninformed firm), configuration 
(where firm  observes  ) dominates configuration  (where neither firm observes the
competitor’s investment level). Hence, configuration  can never emerge as an equilibrium
outcome in the CI-subgame.
Between the configurations  (where firm  observes  ) and  (where firm
 observes ), it can be observed from the numerical results that there exist a 
∗  1
such that for   
∗ both the low type informed firm and the uninformed firm prefer
configuration  where a signaling game is played. Hence, for   
∗, the low type
informed firm has incentive to invest early and do not conceal his investment, while for
  
∗, the low type informed firm has incentive to do competitive intelligence and invest
late.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
There are four possible market research structures. As per proposition 2.1, the two
firms’ expected payoffs under the two symmetric market research structures are respectively:
 (  ) =
(2− )2
4






; ( ) =

4
As per proposition 2.2, the expected payoffs under the two asymmetric market
research structures depends on the parameter values:
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+ (1− ) 2
4













































































































The comparison of the firms’ payoffs determine which market research structure
will emerge in the equilibrium. In specific, we have to do the following four groups of payoffs
comparisons.










the following condition is satisfied:








  ∗; or,















iff either of the following condition is satisfied:








  ∗; or,






• (  ) and  ( ) 
(  ) ≥  (  ) holds if either of the following two conditions is satis-
fied:










+ (1− ) (2− )2
4
), or,
()    and   








•  ( ) and  ( ).
 ( ) ≥  (  ) if either of the following conditions is satisfied:






















We then use the following rules to determine the Nash equilibrium outcome in the
market research stage:
























and  ( ) ≥
 (  ).
























 for  ≤ r
2
2(1−)+(2−1)2


































for   









A.4 Proof of Lemma 2.1
When CI is not possible, in the CI subgame, the only configuration in play is the
case where neither firm observes the competitor’s investment level before choosing his own
. Hence, we only need to compare the firms’ payoffs of configuration  under each of
the market research structure.










































































Because  ≥ 1, it can be readily shown that it is a dominant strategy for both
















A.5 Proof of Proposition 2.4
The conclusion in proposition 2.4 can be seen by directly comparing the equilibrium
results when CI is available (as per proposition 2.3) and the equilibrium results when CI is
not available (as per lemma 2.1).
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2.5
In region D when {¡  ) (   ¢} is played in the equilibrium, firm 
gets higher payoff when the rival firm  conducts CI:








Even in the regions B and C where a firm doing MR and investing early is vulnera-
ble to the competitor’s CI and needs to strategically manage its superior market knowledge,
it can earn higher payoff than that in the benchmark case without CI when  is large
enough.



































Π ( ) =


















emerges as the unique equilibrium, the total payoffs for the two
firms are lower with CI than that in the benchmark case without CI. However, in region D
when (  ) emerges as the unique equilibrium, the presence of CI benefits the industry
as the total expected payoffs for the two firms are higher than that in the benchmark case
without CI.

















































































































































are the equilibrium, the total expected payoff for the two
firms can still be higher than in the benchmark case without CI.
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Appendix B
Technical Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
This is a dynamic game with complete information. Consider the last period of
the -period relationship. By definition, the honest manufacturer honors the contract at





 −  if  = 1
0, if  = 0
=⇒ ∗() =
(
1 if  ≥ 

0, otherwise
That is, the supplier invests if and only if his share of the project value is large enough.














 1, the honest manufacturer has to pay the supplier from his own pocket in
order to induce investment, so he is better off not offering any contract at all.
Since the last period has a unique equilibrium, which is equivalent to the equilib-
rium of a one-shot (single period) game, the unique equilibrium of any period in a finitely
repeated relationship with complete information is identical to the equilibrium of the ter-
minal period, and the result follows.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Consider again the last period in a -period relationship. At Stage 4, because
there is no future interactions with the supplier whatsoever, it is the dominant strategy for
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the rational manufacturer and the only strategy (by definition) for the cheat manufacturer
to take the entire project value and pay the supplier nothing. That is, when the realized
value is  , the manufacturer (either type) renegotiates   = 0. When the realized value
is 0, renegotiation is pointless since the contractual payment to the supplier is anyway
zero. Anticipating zero payment from the manufacturer even when the project succeeds,
the supplier will not invest in Stage 2 of the last period, i.e., ∗ = 0. As a result, both the
supplier and the manufacturer earns zero payoff in the last period.
Again, this is the unique equilibrium to a single period game, and hence it is also
the unique equilibrium of any period in a finitely repeated relationship, i.e.,   = 0 iff
 =  , and 
∗
 = 0 ∀.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3.1
The supplier’s beliefs over the buyer’s type are −→ 21 = (21 21 21) at the begin-
ning of the last period. We solve the multi-stage last period game backward.
At Stage 4, the honest manufacturer will honor the contract. And as discussed
earlier, because there is no future considerations, both the rational manufacturer and the
cheat manufacturer will renegotiate  2 = 0 iff 2 =  .
Anticipating the manufacturer’s strategy in the payment stage, the supplier knows
that he will only get paid if the project succeeds and the manufacturer is honest, so the






22 − , if 2 = 1
0, if 2 = 0
=⇒ ∗2(2) =




Clearly, if 22 = 0, i.e., if the supplier is convinced that the manufacturer is not the honest
type by the beginning of Stage 2, the supplier will not invest at all, which is consistent with
lemma 3.2.
With an contract 2, and the three types of manufacturer’s payoff are respectively,
2 = (1− 2)∗2(2)
2 = 2 = 
∗
2(2)
Clearly, the honest manufacturer’s payoff is decreasing in 2; thus, from the honest man-
ufacturer’s perspective, an ∗2 that leaves the supplier with exactly zero surplus in expec-
tation is optimal. The rational and the cheat manufacturer, on the other hand, always get
2 = 2 = 
∗
2(2) for any 2; therefore, they can promise any 2 (even an 2  1) to
induce the supplier to invest because they always renegotiate zero payment to the supplier
in Stage 4. The supplier is certainly aware of these incentives. As a result, any 2 different
from the one that the honest manufacturer finds optimal convinces the supplier that the
manufacturer is not honest (22 = 0), leading to zero investment by the supplier. On the
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equilibrium path, both the rational type and the cheat type pool with the honest manufac-
turer, and offer the same 2 to the supplier, so the supplier’s beliefs are unchanged after
Stage 1 (i.e., 22 = 

21). Equation (3.1) details the supplier’s beliefs update structure.
Hence, in Stage 1 the honest manufacturer solves,
∗2 = argmax
0









And the result follows.
B.4 Proof of Propositions 3.2 and 3.3
Below we prove the first period equilibrium in a two period game with trembles.
The one without trembles is a special case with  = 0.
The second period equilibrium is identical to the one specified in proposition 3.1,
excepting by replacing −→ 0 with the supplier’s updated beliefs at the beginning of the second
period −→ 21 (detailed discussed below).
(i) The payment stage of period 1 and the supplier’s belief updates across periods.
At the Stage 4 of the first period, when the realized value is 0, all types of man-
ufacturer honor the contract. When the realized value is  , by definition, the honest type
honors the contract and the cheat type renegotiates with   = 0; both are identical to
their myopic strategy. The rational type can either renegotiate or honor the contract: by
renegotiating, the rational type gets the entire  in period which then reveals his type to
be not honest (i.e., 21 = 0), resulting in zero investment by the supplier in period 2; by
honoring the contract, the rational manufacturer needs to pay the supplier 1  in period 1,
which allows him to hide his type and gives the supplier incentive to invest again in period
2 (and he can renegotiate then to get the entire value). Because the strategy of honoring
the contract contradicts with the rational type’s myopic strategy of renegotiating, he also
needs to take into consideration that he may tremble into renegotiation with probability .
In summary, the rational type’s trade-off is as follows.
Renegotiate:  + 0
Honor the contract: [(1− 1 ) +  ] + (1−)
Clearly, the rational type’s dynamically optimal strategy is to renegotiate when 1 ≥ ,
and to honor the contract when 1  .
Hence, after Stage 4, the supplier updates his beliefs into −→ 21 = (21  21  21 )
in the following way:
(a) −→ 21 = (12  12  12 ) if ̃1 = 0











) if ̃1 =  

1 ≥  and manufacturer renegotiates
(c) −→ 21 = (0 1 0)if ̃1 =  1 ≥  and manufacturer honors contract
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)if ̃1 =  

1   and manufacturer renego-
tiates







 0)if ̃1 =  

1  , and manufacturer
honors contract
(ii) The effort stage of period 1.
Because the supplier gets zero expected payoff in the terminal period 2 (as per
proposition 3.1), the supplier only needs to consider his first period payoff at this stage.
Based on the manufacturer’s strategy in the payment stage above, the supplier solves,
∗1 (

1 ) = argmax
1
⎧⎨⎩
1 (1− 12 − 12 ) −  if 1 = 1 1 ≥ 
1 (1−12 − 12 ) − , if 1 = 1 1  
0, if 1 = 0





1, if 1 ≥ max( (1−12 −12 )  ) or   

1 ≥ (1−12 −12 )
0 otherwise
(iii)Contract stage of the period 1.
For the same reason discussed above, both the rational type and the cheat type
mimic the honest type in the contract stage and offer the same contract, otherwise they
will reveal their types to be not honest and get no investment from the supplier.




[(1− 1 ) + ∗2(−→ 21)] + (1− )∗2(−→ 21), if ∗1 (1 ) = 1
0 + ∗2(





[(1− 1 ) +  − ] + (1− )( − 11 ), if 1 ≥ max(

(1−11−11)  )






] + (1− )( − 
11














1 , if (1−11 − 11) ≤ 2
where the ∗1 and 
∗
1 denote that, with such an contract, the rational manufac-
turer’s dynamically optimal strategy in the payment stage of period 1 is to pool with the
honest type and honor the contract, and to separate from the honest type and renegotiate.
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B.5 Proof of Theorem 3.1
This theorem is an immediate results by comparing the three types of manufac-
turer’s expected payoffs in a two-period relationship, as detailed in proposition 3.3).
When  ≥  = 1−11−(2 )
11
, i.e., 1−11−11 ≤ 2 (part II of proposition
3.3), the three types of manufacturer’s payoffs are
Π = 2 − 2
Π = 2 −
2− (11 + 11)
1− 11 − 11





≤   1, 1− 11 − 11  0 and   1,
2− (11 + 11)
1− 11 − 11
 
2− (11 + 11)
1−11 − 11
 ≥ [2− (11 + 11)]2  2
thus,
Π = 2 −
2− (11 + 11)
1− 11 − 11
  2 − 2 = Π = Π
In other words, when  ≥ , the rational type and the cheat type get the same payoff,
which is higher than the honest type.
When   , i.e., 1 −11 − 11  2 , the three types of manufacturer’s
payoffs are
Π = (2−) −
(1−)
1−11 − 11








1− 11 − 11
Π = 2 − 2




Π = (2−) −
(1−)
1−11 − 11
 (2−) − (1−)2 = 2 − 2 = Π
that is, when  
1−11−(2 )
11
, the rational type always gets higher payoff than the cheat
type in a two-period relationship.
For the honest type to gets higher payoff than the rational type (and thereby also








1− 11 − 11










(1− 11 − 11)
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Lemma C.1 will be used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma C.1 () The dominant strategy for the unconstrained type of principal is to rene-
gotiate in stage 4 of the terminal period 
() If  = 0 then  = 0 ∀ ∈ { + 1  } 
Proof. () Profit by renegotiating in the terminal period  is ̃ ( ), which is
greater than (1− ) ̃ (), the profit without renegotiating, since  ≥ 0
() If  = 0 then  = 0 ∀ ∈ { + 1  }  By part ()  the unconstrained
type of principal renegotiates in stage 4 of the terminal period  ; and since  = 0 the
agent’s best-response is ∗ = 0 in stage 2. Hence, the unconstrained principal renegotiates
in stage 4 of period  −1 the agent responds with ∗−1 = 0 since −1 = 0, and the result
unravels by backward induction.
To prove Theorem 1, we proceed for now with the assumption that the equilibrium
strategy of the unconstrained type of principal is to not renegotiate in stage 4 of the non-
terminal periods. We will prove that the assumption holds under our proposed equilibrium.
The honest principal never renegotiates and Lemma C.1 has established the unconstrained
principal’s strategy in the terminal period. With the principal’s equilibrium strategy in
stage 4 thus settled, we derive a Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium in terms of () the
contract offered by the principal in stage 1; () the agent’s beliefs after stage 1; and ()
the agent’s investment strategy in stage 2.
Consider stage 1 of any period  ∈ {1  }: A pure strategy (separating) equi-
librium where  6=  is easily ruled out since the agent must assign a belief ̂ = 0 after
stage 1 upon observing 
¡6=  ¢  resulting in 0 continuation payoff for the unconstrained
principal in periods  ∈ { + 1 } per Lemma C.1. Consider, therefore, a pooling




 ∀ ∈ {1  } and the agent’s belief after stage











The agent’s belief of equation (1) satisfies the Intuitive Criterion of Cho and
Kreps (1987). Moreover,   0 for any  ∈ {1  } or the game never proceeds to period

Define {=1} = 1 if  = 1 and 0 otherwise. Also, Π
( ·) is the expected
continuation payoff of the Principal of type  where  ∈ { } with  ≤  periods to
go, and  is the agent’s expected payoff in period  ∈ {1  }. In stage 1 of period
 ∈ {1   − 1}  i.e., with − +1 periods to go including the  period the honest type
of principal solves the following program which maximizes his expected continuation payoff
subject to the individual rationality constraint (IRC) of the agent (the unconstrained type
of principal mimics and solves an identical program in the pooling equilibrium):
Π ( − + 1 ) = max
0≤≤1
³
(1− ) ̃ () +Π ( −  +1)
´

0 ≤  = max
∈{01}
((1− (1− )) −  ) {=1}
where +1 =

 + (1−) (1− )  and
Π (1) = max
0≤≤1
(1− ) ̃ ( )

0 ≤  = max
∈{01}
( − ) {=1}
Π (1) is the honest principal’s expected payoff in the terminal period. Since
the unconstrained principal always renegotiates in the terminal period per Lemma C.1,
the agent is paid only when ̃ (1) =  and the principal is of the honest type (the
probabilities of which are  and  respectively) The agent invests, i.e.,  = 1 when-
ever  ≥  = ∗ . Hence, in equilibrium, the principal optimally offers  = ∗
( 1 under our technical condition) so that ∗ = 1 and the IRC binds for the agent. In
the non-terminal period   (1− ) is the probability of renegotiation through trembles
by the unconstrained principal, and hence, (1− (1− )) is the probability that the agent
is paid his contractual share in the event ̃ (1) =  . The agent invests, i.e.,  = 1
∀ ∈ {1  − 1} whenever  ≥ (1−(1−)) = ∗ ( 1)  In equilibrium, both types of
principal optimally offer  = 
∗
 ∀ ∈ {1   − 1} so that ∗ = 1 and IRC binds for the
agent.
Finally, we prove that the unconstrained type of principal has no profitable devia-
tion under the proposed equilibrium from his (assumed) strategy of not renegotiating in the
non-terminal periods. Consider  = 2 first. On the equilibrium path, it is optimal for the
unconstrained principal to not renegotiate in stage 4 of period 1 because the incremental
gain from renegotiation (∗1 ) is less than the expected future payoff ( ) under our tech-






. Observe that  is non-decreasing in
, hence ∗ ≤ ∗1   ∀ ∈ {2  − 1}  which completes the proof of Theorem 1 for all
 ≥ 2
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C.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2
The readers can read next section (Proofs of Theorem 4.3) first, as the proof below
will use the result in Theorem 4.3.
We first prove that ∆Π ( 1) is strictly increasing in  .
Note that:
∆Π( + 1 1) ≡ ∆Π( + 1 (0))










where () is given by equation (3)  Rearranging terms and noting that ∆Π( (0)) =
Π( (0))−Π( (0)) we get:
∆Π(+1 (0)) = (1−)∆Π( (0))+
³








∆Π( + 1 (0))  (1− )∆Π( (0)) + ∆Π( (1))  ∆Π( (0))
The last inequality follows from: () (1)  (0) from equation (3)  and () ∆Π( (0)) is
increasing in (0) straightforward to prove from equations (4)  (5)  (7) and (9) 
We now formally prove Theorem 2.
Proof of parts () and () 





























(by assumption) = (1)




= () such that 
2





for  ∈ (∗2 1)  It follows that ∆Π(2)  0 or Π(2)  Π(2) iff  ∈ (∗2 1) 
Now consider  = 3. Because ∆Π() is strictly increasing in  ∆Π (3) 
∆Π(2)  0 for  ∈ (∗2 1). Moreover, it can easily be shown ∀ ≥ 2 that: () ∆Π() is
continuous in  and () ∆Π()  0 for  = 0. Hence, there must exist 0  ∗3  
∗
2,
such that ∆Π(3)  0 for all  ∈ (∗3 1). By extension, there exists a strictly decreasing
sequence ∗2  
∗




  0 for all  ≥ 2, such that ∆Π()  0 or
Π()  Π().
Proof of part () 
We prove part () by contradiction. Suppose lim−→∞∗ =   0 (The limit
exists from the Monotone Convergence Theorem, cf. Abbott 20011.) Then, ∃ ∈ (0 )
which contradicts part () of Theorem 3. Hence,  = 0 i.e., lim−→∞∗ = 0
1Abbott, Stephen. 2001. Understanding Analysis. Springer.
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Proof of part () 
We prove part () only for 1. (Proof for other parameters is analogous and
available from the authors.) It is straightforward to show, from equations (4)  (5) 
(7) and (9)  that ∆Π() is strictly increasing in 1 ∀ ∈ (0 1)  Hence, for any
01  1 ∆Π( 
0
1)  ∆Π( 1)  0 ∀ ∈ (∗  1) Moreover, since ∀ ≥ 2, ∆Π( 1) is
continuous and ∆Π( 1)|=0  0 ∀1 ∈ (0 1)  there must exist 0  0∗  ∗ such that
∆Π( 01)  0 for all  ∈ (0∗  1).
C.3 Proof of Theorem 4.3
Proof of part () 
We construct a lower bound () for∆Π () = Π()−Π() so that∆Π () 
0 whenever  ()  0 Towards this end, first note that the agent updates his belief only
when ̃ (1) =  . Hence, consider only the ‘successful’ periods (where ̃ (1) =  ) Denote
by () the agent’s belief in a period when there have been  ≥ 0 successful investments in




the equilibrium contractual shares in the termi-
nal (T) and non-terminal (NT) periods respectively when there have been  ≥ 0 successful
investments in prior periods. Then,
() =
(






for 1 ≤  ≤  (C.3)
(Note that (0) ≡ 1) From Theorem 1 and equation (3), the equilibrium con-








(0) + (1− (0))(1−)


































∀ ≥ 0 (C.6)
Let  be the number of successful investments prior to period  The honest
principal’s total expected payoff over  periods is:
Π() = Π( | = 0)Pr ( = 0) +
−1X
=1
Π( | =  ) Pr ( = )
Thus,











































+1(1− )−1− (1−) ³
−∗
( )














where  are the number of successful investments prior to period  The first
term is the expected difference in payoffs between the two types when the unconstrained
type trembles in a period  ≤  − 1 and the second term is the expected difference in
payoffs when the unconstrained type does not tremble. Bounding equation (9) by using










+1(1− )−1− (1−) ³
−∗
(0)











































 − ∗(0) = ()


















from Theorem 1) It therefore follows that ∆Π ()  0





Proof of part () 
It can be shown that ∆Π () of equation (9) is strictly increasing in   1, and
decreasing in  (The proofs are technical in nature and are omitted.) Hence, the threshold
value of  above which ∆Π ()  0 must be decreasing in   1, and increasing in 
(That such a threshold exists is proved in part () ) Finally, that this threshold value of 
decreases in  follows from parts ()  () and () of Theorem 2.
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